Coloque a opção world trade center

Opção de venda
O que é uma 'opção de venda'?
Uma opção de venda é um contrato de opção que dá ao proprietário o direito, mas não a obrigação, de vender uma quantia especificada de um título subjacente a um preço especificado dentro de um prazo especificado. Isso é o oposto de uma opção de compra, que dá ao titular o direito de comprar ações.
Coloque em uma chamada.
QUEBRANDO PARA BAIXO 'Put Option'
Uma opção de venda se torna mais valiosa à medida que o preço da ação subjacente se deprecia em relação ao preço de exercício. Por outro lado, uma opção de venda perde seu valor à medida que o estoque subjacente aumenta e o tempo para a expiração se aproxima.
Decaimento do Tempo.
O valor de uma opção de venda diminui devido ao decaimento do tempo, porque a probabilidade da ação cair abaixo do preço de exercício especificado diminui. Quando uma opção perde seu valor de tempo, o valor intrínseco é deixado, o que equivale à diferença entre o preço de exercício menos o preço da ação. As opções de venda fora do dinheiro e no dinheiro têm um valor intrínseco de zero porque não haveria nenhum benefício em exercer a opção. Os investidores poderiam vender a descoberto ao preço corrente de mercado, em vez de exercer uma opção de venda fora do dinheiro a um preço de exercício indesejável, o que produziria perdas.
Exemplo Longo de Opção de Venda.
Por exemplo, suponha que um investidor possua uma opção de venda sobre ações hipotéticas TAZR com um preço de exercício de $ 25 que expira em um mês. Portanto, o investidor tem o direito de vender 100 ações da TAZR a um preço de US $ 25 até a data de expiração no próximo mês, que geralmente é a terceira sexta-feira do mês. Se as ações da TAZR caírem para US $ 15 e o investidor exercer a opção, o investidor poderá comprar 100 ações da TAZR por US $ 15 no mercado e vender as ações ao escritor da opção por US $ 25 cada. Consequentemente, o investidor faria $ 1.000 (100 x ($ 25- $ 15)) na opção de venda. Observe que o valor máximo de lucro potencial neste exemplo ignora o prêmio pago para obter a opção de venda.
[Uma opção de venda prolongada é apenas um tipo de contrato de opções que você pode usar para colocar as probabilidades a seu favor. Se você estiver interessado em outras maneiras de se envolver com o mercado de opções e negociar da maneira que os profissionais mais bem-sucedidos fazem, não deixe de conferir o Curso de Negociação de Opções da Investopedia Academy.]
Exemplo de Opção de Venda Curta.
Ao contrário de uma opção de venda longa, uma opção de venda a descoberto obriga um investidor a receber ou comprar ações das ações subjacentes. Suponha que um investidor esteja otimista sobre ações hipotéticas da FAB, que atualmente está sendo negociada a US $ 42,50, e não acredita que cairá abaixo de US $ 35 nas próximas duas semanas. O investidor poderia cobrar um prêmio escrevendo uma opção de venda na FAB com um preço de exercício de US $ 35 por US $ 1,50. Portanto, o investidor cobraria um total de US $ 150, ou US $ 1,50 * 100. Se a FAB fecha acima de US $ 35, o investidor manteria o prêmio coletado, uma vez que as opções expirariam fora do dinheiro e não valeriam nada. Por outro lado, se a FAB fechar abaixo de US $ 35, o investidor deve comprar 100 ações da FAB a US $ 35, devido à obrigação contratual.

Coloque a opção World Trade Center
UMA INVESTIGAÇÃO EXCLUSIVA ON-LINE DA ÁSIA: Não pode haver disputa que comércio especulativo em opções de venda & # 8211; onde uma parte aposta que uma ação cairá abruptamente em valor & # 8211; cravado nos dias em torno de 11 de setembro de 2001 & # 8211; mesmo que a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários dos Estados Unidos e a Comissão do 11 de Setembro não o digam. Mais do que algumas pessoas devem ter avisado antecipadamente sobre os ataques terroristas e gastaram milhões de dólares.
O seguinte artigo foi publicado primeiro no Asia Times Online em:
Existe alguma verdade nas alegações de que círculos informados obtiveram lucros substanciais nos mercados financeiros em conexão com os ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001 nos Estados Unidos?
Indiscutivelmente, o melhor lugar para começar é examinando as opções de venda, que ocorreram por volta de terça-feira, 11 de setembro de 2001, em uma extensão anormal, e no início via software que desempenhou um papel fundamental: o Sistema de Informação Gerencial do Promotor. abreviado como PROMIS. [Eu]
PROMIS é um programa de software que parece ser equipado com quase & # 8222; mágico & # 8220; habilidades. Além disso, é o tema de uma disputa de décadas entre seu inventor, Bill Hamilton, e várias pessoas / instituições associadas a agências de inteligência, firmas de consultoria militar e de segurança. [1]
Um dos & # 8222; mágico & # 8220; As capacidades do PROMIS, supõe-se, são equipadas com inteligência artificial e foram, aparentemente, desde o início, “capazes de ler e integrar simultaneamente diversos programas de computador ou bancos de dados, independentemente do idioma em que os programas originais haviam sido. escrito ou os sistemas operacionais e plataformas em que esse banco de dados foi instalado atualmente. & # 8220; [2]
E então fica realmente interessante:
O que você faria se possuísse um software que pudesse pensar, entender todas as principais linguagens do mundo, que fornecessem peeps nos gabinetes de computador de outras pessoas, que pudessem inserir dados em computadores sem o conhecimento das pessoas? poderia preencher lacunas além do raciocínio humano e também prever o que as pessoas fazem "# 8211; antes de eles fazerem isso? Você provavelmente usaria, não é? [3]
Concedido, esses recursos soam dificilmente críveis. De fato, toda a história do PROMIS, que Mike Ruppert desenvolve no decorrer de seu livro Crossing the Rubicon em todas as suas facetas e reviravoltas bizarras, parece que alguém desenvolveu um romance no estilo de Philip K Dick e William Gibson. No entanto, o que Ruppert coletou sobre o PROMIS é baseado em fontes confiáveis, bem como em resultados de investigações pessoais, que aguardam um júri para dar uma primeira olhada crítica.
Isso parece ainda mais urgente se você adicionar aos recursos do PROMIS que foi um fato que o PROMIS foi usado para uma grande variedade de propósitos por agências de inteligência, incluindo o monitoramento em tempo real de transações de ações em todo o mundo. s principais mercados financeiros & # 8220 ;. [4]
Estamos, portanto, lidando com um software que.
a) Infiltra o computador e os sistemas de comunicação sem ser notado.
b) Pode manipular dados.
c) É capaz de rastrear o mercado global de ações em tempo real.
O ponto c é relevante para tudo o que aconteceu em conexão com as transações nunca completamente esclarecidas que ocorreram imediatamente antes de 11 de setembro [5] e das quais o ex-presidente do Deutsche Bundesbank Ernst Weltke disse que "não poderia ter sido planejado e realizado sem um certo conhecimento & # 8220;. [6]
Pedi especificamente ao jornalista financeiro Max Keiser, que durante anos trabalhou na Wall Street como negociador de ações e opções, sobre os negócios de opções de venda. Keiser apontou nesse contexto que ele havia falado com muitos corretores nas torres do World Trade Center naquela época. Eu ouvi em primeira mão sobre a companhia aérea colocar o comércio de corretores em Cantor Fitzgerald dias antes. Ele então conversou comigo sobre uma questão explosiva, sobre a qual Ruppert elaborou em detalhes em Crossing the Rubicon.
Max Keiser: Há muitos aspectos relativos a essas compras de opções que ainda não foram divulgadas. Eu também trabalhei na Alex Brown & amp; Filhos (ABS) O Deutsche Bank comprou a Alex Brown & amp; Filhos em 1999. Quando os ataques ocorreram, a ABS era de propriedade do Deutsche Bank. Uma pessoa importante no ABS era Buzzy Krongard. Eu o encontrei várias vezes nos escritórios em Baltimore. Krongard havia se transferido para se tornar diretor executivo da CIA. As compras de opções, nas quais a ABS estava envolvida, ocorreram nos escritórios da ABS em Baltimore. O barulho que ocorreu entre Baltimore, New York City e Langley foi interessante, como você pode imaginar, para dizer o mínimo.
Sob consideração, aqui está o fato de que Alex Brown, uma subsidiária do Deutsche Bank (onde muitos dos supostos sequestradores do 11 de setembro lidaram com suas transações bancárias - Mohammed Atta, por exemplo) negociou compras de opções de compra maciça na United Airlines Company UAL através do Bolsa de Opções de Diretoria de Chicago (CBOE) & # 8211; Para o constrangimento dos investigadores, como relatou o jornal britânico The Independent. [7]
Em 12 de setembro, o presidente do conselho do Deutsche Bank Alex Brown, Mayo A Shattuck III, repentinamente e silenciosamente renunciou ao cargo, embora ainda tivesse um contrato de três anos com um salário anual de vários milhões de dólares. Pode-se perceber isso como algo estranho.
Algumas semanas depois, o porta-voz da agência de inteligência da CIA, Tom Crispell, recusou todos os comentários, quando foi contatado por um relatório para o site de Ruppert, From the Wilderness, e perguntado sobre o assunto. se o Departamento do Tesouro ou o FBI questionaram o diretor executivo da CIA e o ex-CEO do Deutsche Bank-Alex Brown [diretor executivo], AB & # 8218; Buzzy & # 8216; Krongard, sobre o monitoramento dos mercados financeiros pela CIA usando o PROMIS e sua posição anterior como superintendente do cliente privado Brown & # 8216; relações. & # 8220; [8]
Pouco antes de ser recrutado pessoalmente pelo ex-chefe da CIA, George Tenet, para a CIA, Krongard supervisionava principalmente clientes particulares em Alex Brown. [9]
Em qualquer caso, após o 11 de setembro, no primeiro dia de negociação, quando os mercados de ações dos EUA estavam novamente abertos, o preço das ações da UAL caiu 43%. (As quatro aeronaves seqüestradas em 11 de setembro foram o vôo 11 da American Airlines, o vôo 77 da American Airlines e os vôos 175 e 93 da UAL).
Com sua experiência como ex-operador de opções, Keiser explicou uma questão importante para mim nesse aspecto.
Max Keiser: As opções de venda são, se forem empregadas em um mercado especulativo, basicamente apostam que os preços das ações cairão abruptamente. O comprador, que faz um contrato específico de tempo com um vendedor, não precisa possuir o estoque no momento em que o contrato é adquirido.
Relacionado com a questão do insider trading via (put ou call) opções, há também uma definição notável pelos economistas suíços Remo Crameri, Marc Chesney e Loriano Mancini, notadamente que um trade de opção pode ser identificado como informado & # 8220; & # 8211; mas ainda não está (legalmente) comprovado & # 8211; & # 8222; quando é caracterizada por um incremento grande incomum no interesse aberto e volume, induz ganhos grandes, e não é coberto na bolsa de valores & # 8220 ;. [10]
O interesse aberto descreve contratos que não foram liquidados (foram exercidos) até o final do pregão, mas ainda estão em aberto. Não coberto no mercado de ações significa que o comprador de uma opção (de venda ou de compra) não detém ações do ativo subjacente, pelo que ele pode ser capaz de mitigar ou compensar perdas se o seu negócio não funcionar, ou redigido diferentemente: não se faz hedge, porque é desnecessário, já que se sabe que a aposta é uma, perdão, coisa de certeza absoluta. & # 8220; (A este respeito, portanto, não é realmente uma aposta, porque o resultado não é incerto, mas uma conclusão precipitada.)
Neste caso, o veículo do cálculo foi "opções de venda ridiculamente baratas que dão ao titular o direito" & # 8216; por um período de tempo para vender certas ações a um preço que é muito abaixo do preço de mercado atual & # 8211; o que é uma aposta altamente arriscada, porque você perde dinheiro se no vencimento o preço de mercado ainda for maior que o preço acordado na opção. No entanto, quando essas ações caíram muito mais profundamente após os ataques terroristas, essas opções multiplicaram seu valor várias centenas de vezes, porque agora o preço de venda especificado na opção era muito superior ao preço de mercado. Estes jogos arriscados com opções curtas são uma indicação segura para investidores que sabiam que dentro de alguns dias aconteceria algo que reduziria drasticamente o preço de mercado dessas ações. [11]
Software como o PROMIS, por sua vez, é usado com a intenção precisa de monitorar os mercados de ações em tempo real para rastrear movimentos de preços que pareçam suspeitos. Portanto, os serviços de inteligência dos EUA devem ter recebido avisos claros das transações singulares, nunca antes vistas antes do 11 de setembro.
De grande importância no que diz respeito à pista, que deve levar os perpetradores se você estivesse seriamente pensando em ir atrás deles, é isto:
Max Keiser: A Corporação de Compensação de Opções tem o dever de lidar com as transações, e o faz de forma anônima & # 8211; enquanto o banco que executa a transação como corretor pode determinar a identidade de ambas as partes.
Mas isso pode dificilmente ter sido a intenção das autoridades reguladoras quando a pista levou, entre outros, Alvin Bernard & Buzzy & # 8220; Krongard, Alex Brown & amp; Filhos e a CIA. Ruppert, no entanto, descreve este caso em Atravessando o Rubicão em toda a extensão possível. [12]
Além disso, também existem maneiras e meios para que os internos ocultem seus rastros. Para ser menos óbvio, os insiders poderiam negociar um pequeno número de contratos. Estes poderiam ser negociados sob várias contas para evitar chamar a atenção para grandes volumes de negociação passando por uma única conta grande. Eles também poderiam negociar pequenos volumes em cada contrato, mas negociar mais contratos para evitar chamar a atenção. À medida que o interesse aberto aumenta, os não-insiders podem detectar um sinal percebido e aumentar sua atividade de negociação. Os insiders podem voltar a entrar em mais transações com base em um sinal comercial aparentemente significativo do mercado. A este respeito, seria difícil para a CBOE para descobrir os insiders dos não-insiders, porque ambos estão negociando fortemente. [13]
A questão que precisa de esclarecimentos aqui é geralmente julgada por Keiser como segue:
Max Keiser: Meu pensamento é que muitos (não todos) daqueles que morreram no 11 de setembro eram mercenários financeiros & # 8211; e devemos sentir o mesmo sobre eles como nos sentimos sobre todos os mercenários que são mortos. A tragédia é que essas empresas misturaram civis com mercenários e também foram mortas. Então as empresas em Wall Street usaram civis como escudos humanos?
De acordo com um relatório da Bloomberg publicado no início de outubro de 2001, a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários dos Estados Unidos (SEC) iniciou uma investigação sobre certas transações no mercado de ações em 11 de setembro, incluindo 38 companhias, entre elas: American Airlines, United Airlines, Continental Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, American Express, American International Group, AXA SA, Bank of America, Bank of New York, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Morgan Stanley, General Motors e Raytheon. [14]
Por enquanto, tudo bem. No mesmo mês, no entanto, o jornal San Francisco Chronicle informou que a SEC tomou medidas sem precedentes para substituir centenas, senão mesmo milhares de interessados ​​chaves no setor privado, em suas investigações. Em um comunicado enviado a quase todas as empresas listadas nos EUA, a SEC solicitou às empresas endereçadas que designassem pessoal sênior para a investigação, que estaria ciente da "natureza sensível". do caso e poder-se-ia confiar em "exercer a discrição adequada & # 8220 ;. [15]
Em essência, tratava-se de controlar informações, não de fornecer e divulgar fatos. Tal curso de ação envolve conseqüências comprometedoras. Ruppert:
O que acontece quando você submete alguém em uma investigação nacional de segurança ou criminal é que você torna ilegal divulgar publicamente o que sabe. Jogada inteligente. Com efeito, eles se tornam agentes do governo e são controlados por regulamentações governamentais, e não por sua própria consciência. Na verdade, eles podem ser jogados na cadeia sem uma audiência, se falarem publicamente. Eu tenho visto esta ameaça implícita de tempos em tempos com investigadores federais, agentes de inteligência e até mesmo membros do Congresso dos Estados Unidos que estão tão presos a juramentos e acordos de sigilo que nem sequer são capazes de divulgar atividades criminosas dentro do governo por medo de encarceramento. . [16]
Entre os relatórios sobre suspeitas de insider trading mencionadas em Crossing the Rubicon / From the Wilderness está uma lista que foi publicada sob o título & quot; Black Tuesday: O Maior Scam de Informações Privilegiadas do Mundo & # 8220; pelo Instituto Internacional de Políticas para o Contraterrorismo de Herzliyya, em 21 de setembro de 2001:
Entre os dias 6 e 7 de setembro, a CBOE viu compras de 4.744 opções de compra na United Airlines, mas apenas 396 opções de compra. Assumindo que 4.000 das opções foram compradas por pessoas com conhecimento antecipado dos ataques iminentes, estes “insiders” (insiders & # 82202) teria lucrado quase US $ 5 milhões. Em 10 de setembro, 4.516 opções de compra da American Airlines foram compradas na bolsa de Chicago, em comparação com apenas 748 chamadas. Mais uma vez, não havia notícias naquele momento para justificar esse desequilíbrio; novamente, assumindo que 4.000 dessas opções representam “insiders”, elas representariam um ganho de cerca de $ 4 milhões. [Os níveis de opções de compra adquiridos acima eram mais de seis vezes maiores que o normal.] Nenhum comércio similar em outras companhias aéreas ocorreu na bolsa de Chicago nos dias imediatamente anteriores à Black Tuesday. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & amp; A Co, que ocupava 22 andares do World Trade Center, viu 2.157 de suas opções de compra de US $ 45 em outubro, compradas nos três pregões anteriores à Black Tuesday; Isso se compara a uma média de 27 contratos por dia antes de 6 de setembro. O preço das ações da Morgan Stanley caiu de US $ 48,90 para US $ 42,50 depois dos ataques. Assumindo que 2.000 desses contratos de opções foram comprados com base no conhecimento dos ataques que se aproximavam, seus compradores poderiam ter lucrado pelo menos US $ 1,2 milhão. Merrill Lynch & amp; Co, com sede perto das Torres Gêmeas, viu 12.215 opções de compra de US $ 45 em outubro, compradas nos quatro pregões anteriores aos ataques; o volume médio anterior dessas ações havia sido de 252 contratos por dia (um aumento de 1.200%). Quando as negociações foram retomadas, as ações da Merrill caíram de US $ 46,88 para US $ 41,50; assumindo que 11.000 contratos de opção foram comprados por "insiders", seu lucro teria sido de cerca de US $ 5,5 milhões. Reguladores europeus estão examinando negócios na Munich Re da Suíça, Swiss Re, e AXA da França, todas as principais resseguradoras com exposição ao desastre da Black Tuesday. (Nota: A AXA também possui mais de 25% das ações da American Airlines, fazendo com que os ataques sejam um duplo golpe para eles.) [17]
Relativamente às declarações do ex-presidente do Deutsche Bundesbank Ernst Welteke, o seu teor em vários relatórios de imprensa é o seguinte:
O presidente do banco central alemão, Ernst Welteke, relata depois que um estudo de seu banco indica: "Há sinais cada vez mais claros de que havia atividades nos mercados financeiros internacionais que devem ter sido realizadas com o conhecimento especializado necessário," # 8220; não apenas em ações de setores altamente afetados, como companhias aéreas e seguradoras, mas também em ouro e petróleo. [Daily Telegraph, 23/9/2001] Seus pesquisadores encontraram "provas quase irrefutáveis ​​de insider trading". [Miami Herald, 24 de setembro de 2001] & # 8222; Se você olhar para os movimentos nos mercados antes e depois do ataque, faz o seu testa sulco. Mas é extremamente difícil realmente verificá-lo. & # 8220; No entanto, ele acredita que "em um ou outro caso, será possível identificar a fonte". [Fox News, 9/22/2001] Welteke relata & # 8222; uma ascensão fundamentalmente inexplicável & # 8220; nos preços do petróleo antes dos ataques [Miami Herald, 24/9/2001] e, em seguida, um novo aumento de 13 por cento no dia após os ataques. O ouro sobe sem parar durante dias após os ataques. [Daily Telegraph, 23/9/2001] [18]
Relacionado a essas observações, enviei um pedido via e-mail para a assessoria de imprensa do Deutsche Bundesbank em 1 de agosto de 2011, do qual eu esperava aprender:
Como o Bundesbank lidou com essa informação? As agências federais dos EUA pediram para ver o estudo? Com quem o Bundesbank compartilhou essa informação? E adicionalmente: 1. Pode confirmar que existe um tal estudo do Bundesbank relativo ao abuso de informação do 11 de Setembro, que foi realizado em Setembro de 2001?
2. Se sim: qual é o título?
3. Se sim: quem foram os autores?
4. Se sim: o estudo já foi disponibilizado ao público?
Em 2 de agosto, fui então informado: & # 8222; Seu e-mail foi recebido por nós e está sendo processado sob o número 2011/011551. & # 8220; Em última análise, no entanto, a assessoria de imprensa do Deutsche Bundesbank só estava disponível para uma explicação oral no telefone. Com essa explicação, recorri então à assessoria de imprensa do órgão regulador financeiro federal na Alemanha, o Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin, com o seguinte e-mail & # 8211; e isso por razões óbvias:
Ontem, enviei um pedido (veja o final deste e-mail) para a assessoria de imprensa do Deutsche Bundesbank referente a informações privilegiadas relacionadas aos ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001 e, respectivamente, relacionadas a um suposto estudo realizado pelo Deutsche Bundesbank. . O pedido contém o número de referência 2011/011551.
A assessoria de imprensa ou, respectivamente, o Sr. Peter Trautmann estava disponível apenas para uma explicação oral. Repito isso agora, porque está relacionado à sua entidade. Isso será seguido por minhas outras perguntas.
De acordo com uma explicação oral da assessoria de imprensa do Deutsche Bundesbank, nunca houve um estudo detalhado e oficial sobre o uso de informações privilegiadas do Bundesbank. Pelo contrário, tem havido provavelmente uma análise ad-hoc com gráficos correspondentes de movimentos de preços como briefings para o conselho do Bundesbank. Além disso, teria sido dever do Bundesfinanzaufsicht investigar este assunto. A assessoria de imprensa do Bundesbank também não estava disposta a fornecer qualquer informação por escrito, nem mesmo depois da minha insinuação de que esse suposto estudo do Bundesbank está flutuando na Internet há anos sem qualquer contradição. Essa foi a informação oral do gabinete de imprensa do Bundesbank, ou, respectivamente, do Sr. Peter Trautmann.
Agora minhas perguntas para você:
1. O BaFin já investigou o insider trading do 9/11?
2. Com que resultado? Os resultados foram divulgados?
3. Não houve qualquer suspeita que justificasse uma investigação, por exemplo, como empresa danificada: Munich Re, e como compradores de opções de venda da United Airlines Company da UAL: Deutsche Bank / Alex Brown?
4. O Deutsche Bundesbank já perguntou à BaFin quais informações eles têm em relação à negociação com insiders do 11 de setembro & # 8211; por exemplo, para a criação de análises ad-hoc para o Bundesbank?
5. As agências federais dos EUA já perguntaram se a BaFin poderia cooperar com eles em uma investigação?
Você poderia me responder por escrito, ao contrário do Deutsche Bundesbank, por favor? Eu ficaria muito grato por isso!
No dia seguinte, recebi de fato um e-mail sobre esse assunto de Anja Engelland, a assessora de imprensa da BaFin, na qual ela respondeu minhas perguntas da seguinte forma:
1. Sim, o antigo Bundesaufsichtsamt für Wertpapierhandel, BAWe (supervisão federal do mercado de valores mobiliários), realizou uma análise exaustiva das operações.
2. Como resultado, nenhuma evidência de negociação com base em informações privilegiadas foi encontrada. A sua abordagem e resultados foram publicados pelo BAWe ou pelo BaFin nos relatórios anuais para os anos de 2001 (cf. S 26/27) e 2002 (ver pág. 156, acima, primeiro parágrafo). Aqui estão os links. [Veja aqui e aqui.]
3. Ver relatórios anuais de 2001 e 2002. As opções da United Airlines não eram negociadas nas bolsas de valores alemãs (as primeiras opções da EUREX sobre ações dos EUA foram introduzidas somente após os ataques de 11/9/2001); havia warrants na UAL e outras ações dos EUA, mas aquelas negociavam apenas em baixos volumes.
4. Eu pessoalmente não sei sobre tal pedido. Além disso, o próprio Bundesbank teria que comentar sobre isso.
5. A BaFin tem fundamentalmente o direito de trocar informações com autoridades de supervisão estrangeiras, como a SEC, com base em acordos escritos, os chamados memorandos de entendimento (MoU). No que diz respeito a potenciais investigações de autoridades de supervisão estrangeiras, o BaFin infelizmente não pode comentar, isso seria uma questão da respectiva autoridade. Por isso peço compreensão.
Então eu escrevi outra breve nota para a BaFin, a fim de evitar qualquer mal-entendido: suas respostas referem-se, tanto quanto eu entendo, apenas aos mercados financeiros na Alemanha e em Frankfurt, ou não? & # 8220; A resposta da BaFin:
As respostas referem-se ao mercado financeiro alemão como um todo e não apenas à Bolsa de Valores de Frankfurt. Em termos de avaliação dos mercados financeiros estrangeiros, as autoridades competentes são os pontos de contato competentes.
Em minhas investigações, mencionei, entre outras coisas, um estudo científico do economista americano Allen M Poteshman, da Universidade de Illinois em Urbana-Champaign, que havia sido realizado em 2006 sobre a opção de venda em torno do 11 de setembro companhias aéreas envolvidas, United Airlines e American Airlines. Poteshman chegou a esta conclusão: “O exame da negociação de opções que antecedeu o 11 de setembro revela que houve um nível extraordinariamente alto de compra de put. Esta constatação é consistente com investidores informados tendo negociado opções antes dos ataques. & # 8220; [19]
Outro estudo científico foi conduzido pelos economistas Wong Wing-Keung (Universidade Hong Kong Baptista, HKBU), Howard E Thompson (Universidade de Wisconsin) e Kweehong Teh (Universidade Nacional de Cingapura, NUS), cujos resultados foram publicados em abril de 2010 sob a title: Houve negociação anormal nas opções de índice S & amp; P 500 Antes dos ataques de 11 de setembro? & # 8220;
Motivado pelo fato de que houve muitos relatos da mídia sobre possíveis negociações com informações privilegiadas antes do 11 de setembro nos mercados de opções, os autores analisaram este estudo no Standard & amp; Índice 500 do Pobre (Opções do Índice SPX), em particular com foco em estratégias provenientes de um mercado em baixa, ou seja, aquelas sob os rótulos "Comprar Compra", & # 8220; & # 8222; Colocar Bear Spread & # 8220; e "Naked ITM Call Write", já que cada uma delas está de acordo com a suposição de que alguém estaria apostando em um mercado de baixa geral se quisesse lucrar antecipando o evento de 11 de setembro. [20]
Nessa linha, os autores referem-se a um artigo que Erin E Arvedlund publicou em 8 de outubro de 2001, em Barron, cujo título sugere precisamente essa tese: "Siga o dinheiro: os conspiradores do terror poderiam ter se beneficiado mais da queda de todo o mercado do que de ações individuais. & # 8220; [21]
Basicamente, Wong, Thompson e Teh chegaram à conclusão de que nossas descobertas mostram que houve um aumento anormal significativo no volume de negociações no mercado de opções pouco antes dos ataques de 11 de setembro, em contraste com a ausência de volume de negociações anormal. muito antes dos ataques & # 8220 ;.
Mais especificamente, eles afirmaram, "Nossas descobertas das opções de colocação do índice SPX fora do dinheiro (OTM), do dinheiro (ATM) e dentro do dinheiro (ITM) e do índice ITM SPX opções de compra nos levam a rejeitar as hipóteses nulas de que não houve negociação anormal nesses contratos antes de 11 de setembro. & # 8220;
Em vez disso, eles encontraram evidências de um volume de negociação anormal nas opções de venda de índice OTM, ATM e ITM SPX & # 8220; para setembro de 2001, e também nas opções de chamada do índice ITM-SPX & # 8220; para o mesmo mês. Além disso, descobrimos que havia evidências de negociações anormais nas opções de lançamento do OTM, ATM e ITX SPX de setembro de 2001 imediatamente após os ataques de 11 de setembro e antes da data de expiração. Isto sugere que possuir um put era um investimento valioso e aqueles que possuíam eles poderiam vendê-los por um lucro considerável antes da data de expiração. & # 8220;
De tudo isso, eles assumiram a posição de que, embora eles não pudessem provar definitivamente que os insiders estavam ativos no mercado, "nossos resultados fornecem evidências circunstanciais confiáveis ​​para apoiar a alegação de insider trading". [22]
Desambiguação: & # 8222; no dinheiro & # 8220; significa que as circunstâncias surgem em que o proprietário de uma opção de venda está apostando & # 8211; o preço de mercado do ativo subjacente, por exemplo, uma ação (ou, neste caso, um índice de ações), é menor naquele momento em comparação com o preço no momento em que a transação ocorreu. & # 8222; No dinheiro & # 8220; significa que o preço do ativo subjacente permaneceu igual ou quase igual. E & # 8222; out-of-the-money & # 8220; significa que o preço do ativo subjacente subiu, então o oposto do que o proprietário da opção de venda estava apostando aconteceu. & # 8222; No dinheiro & # 8220 ;: vencer. & # 8222; Fora do dinheiro & # 8220 ;: perda.
Há também opções de ITM, ATM e OTM para estratégias de negociação com opções de compra e venda, dependendo do tipo de risco que você gostaria de ter. Por exemplo, de acordo com Wong, Thomson e Teh, a estratégia de compra de compra & # 8222; no caso de um movimento descendente do activo subjacente, é uma alternativa mais barata à venda a descoberto do activo subjacente e é a forma mais simples de lucrar quando se prevê que o preço do activo subjacente diminua.
O uso da opção de venda OTM em comparação com a opção de venda ITM, no entanto, oferece tanto maior recompensa quanto maior potencial de risco (& # 8230;) se o ativo subjacente cair substancialmente no preço. No entanto, caso o ativo subjacente caia apenas moderadamente no preço, o ITM colocado prova ser a melhor escolha (& # 8230;) devido ao diferencial de preço relativo. & # 8220;
É por isso que os especuladores se sairiam melhor, se comprassem as opções de venda ITM, "a menos que os especuladores esperassem um declínio muito substancial no preço do ativo subjacente". # 8220; [23]
Depois que eles calcularam tais estratégias à luz dos dados comerciais disponíveis no CBOE relativos ao 11 de setembro, os três economistas em última análise não aceitam um possível contra-argumento de que seus resultados poderiam ser atribuídos ao fato de que os mercados de ações geralmente estavam caindo e que já havia uma perspectiva de mercado negativa. Finalmente, eles apontaram: “É necessária uma evidência mais conclusiva para provar definitivamente que os insiders estavam de fato ativos no mercado. Embora tenhamos desacreditado a possibilidade de volume anormal devido ao declínio do mercado, esse trabalho investigativo ainda seria um exercício muito envolvido, tendo em vista a multiplicidade de outros fatores de confusão, & # 8220; tais como estratégias de negociação confusas, "intencionalmente empregadas pelos insiders" & # 8220; para atrair menos atenção. [24]
Isso seria "# 8211; e apenas para invalidar estes resultados científicos de uma vez por todas & # 8211; principalmente uma tarefa para a SEC, o FBI e outras autoridades governamentais dos Estados Unidos. No entanto, teremos que esperar por isso em vão.
Acho que não menos digna de menção é um artigo que a revista financeira francesa Les Echos publicou em setembro de 2007 sobre um estudo conduzido por dois professores independentes de economia da Universidade de Zurique, Marc Chesney e Loriano Mancini. A jornalista Marina Alcaraz resumiu o conteúdo das descobertas em Les Echos com estas palavras e com essas explicações do professor Chesney, que eu traduzi pela primeira vez para o alemão (e agora traduzo do francês para o inglês):
"Os volumes atípicos, que são muito raros para ações específicas, levam à suspeita de uso de informações privilegiadas". # 8220; Seis anos após os ataques ao World Trade Center, são os resultados perturbadores de um estudo recente de Marc Chesney e Loriano Mancini, professores da Universidade de Zurique. Os autores, um deles especialista em produtos derivados, o outro especialista em econometria, trabalharam nas opções de venda que foram usadas para especular sobre o declínio nos preços de 20 grandes empresas americanas, particularmente no setor aeroespacial e financeiro.
Sua análise refere-se à execução de transações entre os dias 6 e 10 de setembro de 2001 em comparação com os volumes médios, que foram coletados durante um longo período (10 anos para a maioria das empresas). Além disso, os dois especialistas calcularam a probabilidade de que diferentes opções dentro do mesmo setor em volumes significativos seriam negociadas dentro de alguns dias. "Tentamos ver se os movimentos de ações específicas pouco antes dos ataques eram normais". Mostramos que os movimentos para certas empresas, como a American Airlines, a United Airlines, a Merrill Lynch, o Bank of America, o Citigroup, a Marsh & amp; McLehnan são raros do ponto de vista estatístico, especialmente quando comparados com as quantidades que foram observadas para outros ativos como Coca-Cola ou HP, & # 8220; explica Marc Chesney, ex-professor do HEC e co-autor de Blanchiment et financement du terrorisme (Lavagem de dinheiro e financiamento do terrorismo), publicado pela Editions Ellipses. Por exemplo, 1.535 contratos de opção de compra da American Airlines com greve de US $ 30 e vencimento em outubro de 2001 foram negociados em 10 de setembro, em contraste com uma média diária de cerca de 24 contratos nas últimas três semanas. O fato de que o mercado estava atualmente em um mercado de baixa é insuficiente para explicar esses volumes surpreendentes.
Os autores também examinaram a lucratividade das opções de venda e negociações para um investidor que adquiriu tal produto entre os dias 6 e 10 de setembro. & # 8222; Para títulos específicos, os lucros foram enormes. & # 8220; "Por exemplo, os investidores que adquiriram opções de venda do Citigroup com vencimento em outubro de 2001 poderiam ter lucrado mais de US $ 15 milhões," # 8220; ele disse. Com base na conexão de dados entre volumes e lucratividade, os dois autores concluem que “a probabilidade de que crimes por Insiders (Insider trading) ocorreram, é muito forte nos casos da American Airlines, United Airlines, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, Citigroup e JP Morgan. "Não há provas legais, mas estes são os resultados de métodos estatísticos, confirmando os sinais de irregularidades." [25]
Como Alcaraz continuou a declarar para Les Echos, o estudo de Chesney / Mancini sobre possível insider trading relacionado aos ataques de 11 de setembro não foi o primeiro de seu tipo; but it was in sharp contrast to the findings of the US Securities and Exchange Commission SEC and the 9/11 Commission, since they classified the insider trading as negligible – the trades in question had no connection to 9/11 and had „consistently proved innocuous“.
Different in the assessment is also the scientific work that Chesney and Mancini had published together with Remo Crameri in April 2010 at the University of Zurich, „Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the option markets.“ In the segment that is dedicated to the terror attacks of 9/11, the three authors come to the conclusion, that there had been notable insider trading shortly before the terrorist attacks on September 11 that was based on prior knowledge.
Without elaborating on the detailed explanation of the mathematical and statistical method, which the scientific trio applied during the examination of the put option transactions on the CBOE for the period between 1996 and 2006, I summarize some of their significant conclusions.
„Companies like American Airlines, United Airlines, Boeing“ & # 8211; the latter company is a contractor of the two airlines as aircraft manufacturer – „and to a lesser extent, Delta Air Lines and KLM seem to have been targets for informed trading activities in the period leading up to the attacks. The number of new put options issued during that period is statistically high and the total gains realized by exercising these options amount to more than $16 million. These findings support the results by Poteshman (2006) who also reports unusual activities in the option market before the terrorist attacks.“ [26]
In the banking sector, Chesney, Crameri and Mancini found five informed trading activities in connection to 9/11. „For example the number of new put options with underlying stock in Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan and Merrill Lynch issued in the days before the terrorist attacks was at an unusually high level. The realized gains from such trading strategies are around $11 million.“ [27]
For both areas, the aviation and the banking sector, the authors state that „in nearly all cases the hypothesis“, that the put options were not hedged, „cannot be rejected“. [28]
Regarding the options traded on EUREX, one of the world’s largest trading places for derivatives, which in 1998 resulted from the merger between the German and Swiss futures exchanges DTB and SOFFEX, Chesney, Mancini and Crameri focused on two reinsurance companies, which incurred costs in terms of billions of dollars in connection with the World Trade Center catastrophe: Munich Re and Swiss Re.
On the basis of EUREX trading data provided by Deutsche Bank, the three scientists detected one informed option trade related to Munich Re, which occurred on August 30, 2001. The authors write: „The detected put option with underlying Munich Re matured at the end of September 2001 and had a strike of € 320 (the underlying asset was traded at € 300, 86 on August 30th). That option shows a large increment in open interest of 996 contracts (at 92.2% quintile of its two-year empirical distribution) on August 30th.
Its price on that day was € 10, 22. … On the day of the terrorist attacks, the underlying stock lost more than 15% (the closing price on September 10th was € 261, 88 and on September 11th € 220, 53) and the option price jumped to € 89, 56, corresponding to a return of 776% in eight trading days. & # 8230; The gains … related to the exercise of the 996 new put options issued on August 30th correspond to more than 3.4 million.“ Similar is true, according to the authors, for one informed option trade on Swiss Re on August 20, 2001 with „a return of 4,050% in three trading weeks“, or „more than € 8 million.“ [29]
In a new version of their study that was published on September 7, 2011, the authors stuck to their findings from April 2010. They added the emphasis that in no way the profits gained with the put options to which they point could have been achieved due to sheer fortunate coincidence, but that in fact they were based on prior knowledge which had been exploited. [30]
With those results in terms of what went on at the EUREX according to Chesney, Crameri and Mancini, I again addressed the BaFin, which had written to me that for the financial centers in Germany insider trading around 9/11 could be excluded, and asked:
How does this go with your information that the federal supervisory for securities trading (BAWe) could in its comprehensive analysis not find evidence for insider trading? Do the authors, so to speak, see ghosts with no good reason?
In addition, I stated:
If it is true what Chesney, Crameri and Mancini write, or if you at the BaFin cannot (ad hoc) refute it, would this then cause the BaFin to thoroughly investigate the matter again? If the findings of Chesney, Crameri, and Mancini were true, this would constitute illegal transactions relating to a capital crime, which has no status of limitations, or not?
In case that a need for clarification had arisen at the BaFin, I added Professor Chesney to my e-mail-inquiry in the „carbon copy“ & # 8211; address field, as because these were the results of his scientific work.
The response that I received from BaFin employee Dominika Kula was as follows:
As I already told you in my e-mail, the former federal supervisory for securities trading (BAWe) carried out a comprehensive analysis of the operations in 2001. As a result, no evidence of insider trading has been found. For clarification purposes, I wish to point out that violations of statutory provisions of securities or criminal law can never be excluded with absolute certainty. In order to pursue and prosecute such matters concrete evidence of an unlawful act is required … Such evidence does not exist here.
With regard to the sources you mentioned, I ask for understanding that I can neither comment on scientific analyses, nor on reviews by third parties.
Regarding the statutes of limitations for offences relating to the violation insider trading regulations trading I can give you the following information: A violation of the law to prohibit insider trading is punishable with imprisonment up to 5 years or with fines. The statutes of limitations applied for crimes carrying this kind of penalty (section 78 paragraph 3 No. 4 Penal Code) are five years. These limitations are described in the statutes of limitations (§§ 78 et seq.) (Criminal Code).
In addition, I turned to the EUREX with three questions:
1. How do you as EUREX comment on the findings of Messrs Chesney, Mancini and Crameri?
2. Did you at EUREX perceive the particular trading in Munich Re and Swiss Re it in any way as strange?
3. Have domestic (eg BAWe and BaFin) or foreign (such as the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission) authorities ever inquired if there may have been evidence of insider trading via the EUREX in connection with the 9/11 attacks?
I subsequently received the following response from Heiner Seidel, the deputy head of the press office of the Deutsche Borse in Frankfurt.
We do not give you a public written response on behalf of the Deutsche Börse or Eurex regarding the topics of your inquiry. This is for the following reason: the trade monitoring agency (HüSt) is part of the Exchange, but it is independent and autonomous. Their investigations are confidential and are carried out in close coordination with the BaFin. They are never public, a request which HüSt is therefore not meaningful.
I leave it to the reader to draw his/her conclusions from these two replies from the press offices of BaFin and Deutsche Borse. Regarding the topic of option trades related to 9/11, I once more talked with Swiss historian Dr Daniele Ganser („Operation Gladio“), by asking him this time about the importance of those put options, which were traded shortly before the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Daniele Ganser: This is an important point. This is about demonstrating that there was insider trading on the international stock exchanges before 11 September. Specifically put options, ie speculation on falling stock prices were traded. Among the affected stocks were United Airlines and American Airlines, the two airlines involved in the attacks.
A colleague of mine, Marc Chesney, professor at the Institute of banking at the University of Zurich, has examined these put options. You first of all have to check if there may have been international speculation that the aviation industry would be experiencing a weak period and whether accordingly also put options on Singapore Airlines, Lufthansa and Swiss were bought. This was not the case.
Very significant put option trades were only transacted for these two airlines involved in the attacks. Secondly, you must examine the ratio of put options to call options and look if they had also been purchased to a similarly significant extent that would constitute speculations on rising stock prices. And that is also not the case. There were only significant put options and only significant transactions for United Airlines and American Airlines.
Now you need to look further in order to see who actually bought the put options, because that would be the insider who made millions on September 11. Most people are unaware that money was also earned with the attacks on September 11. The Security and Exchange Commission, SEC, the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States, however, does not publish the information on who bought the put options, because you can do this anonymously. It is disturbing that this data is not made public.
What you have is the 9/11 Commission report, and here it is pointed out , that there has been insider trading, but that this insider trading cannot be traced to [al-Qaeda leader] Osama bin Laden, which means that it is highly unlikely that it had been Bin Laden.
Question: If this is not pursued any further, what does it mean?
Daniele Ganser: This means that the investigation of the terrorist attacks was incomplete, and always at the point where there are contradictions to the SURPRISE story, no further investigations are made. It looks very much as if one wants to examine only one story, the investigation is therefore one-sided. But this does not only apply to the put options. [31]
Interestingly enough, when Dr Ganser points out in his reply that this important data is not published, it is actually only half of the truth. Por quê? The answer is very simple and odd at the same time: David Callahan, the editor of the US magazine SmartCEO, filed a request to the SEC about the put options which occurred prior to September 11 within the framework of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The SEC informed Callahan in its reply of December 23, 2009 under the number „09 07659-FOIA“ do seguinte modo:
This letter is in response to your request seeking access to and copies of the documentary evidence referred to in footnote 130 of Chapter 5 of the September 11 (9/11) Commission Report… We have been advised that the potentially responsive records have been destroyed. [32]
Therefore, we will unfortunately never know exactly how the SEC and the 9/11 Commission came to their conclusions regarding the 9/11 put options trading for their final report, because relevant documents were not only held back, but also destroyed – and that in spite of an agreement between the SEC and the National Archive of the United States, in which the SEC has agreed to keep all records for at least 25 years. [33]
The 9/11 Commission report wrote this in footnote 130 of Chapter 5, which briefly focuses on the alleged insider trading:
Highly publicized allegations of insider trading in advance of 9 / 11 generally rest on reports of unusual pre-9/11 trading activity in companies whose stock plummeted after the attacks. Some unusual trading did in fact occur, but each such trade proved to have an innocuous explanation. For example, the volume of put options – investments that pay off only when a stock drops in price – surged in the parent companies of United Airlines on September 6 and American Airlines on September 10 – highly suspicious trading on its face.
Yet, further investigation has revealed that the trading had no connection with 9/11. A single US-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al-Qaeda purchased 95 percent of the UAL puts on September 6 as part of a trading strategy that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10. Similarly, much of the seemingly suspicious trading in American on September 10 was traced to a specific US-based options trading newsletter, faxed to its subscribers on Sunday, September 9, which recommended these trades.
These examples typify the evidence examined by the investigation. The SEC and the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities industry, devoted enormous resources to investigating this issue, including securing the cooperation of many foreign governments. These investigators have found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous. (Joseph Cella interview (Sept 16, 2003; May 7, 2004; May 10-11, 2004); FBI briefing (Aug 15, 2003); SEC memo, Division of Enforcement to SEC Chair and Commissioners, „Pre-September 11, 2001 Trading Review,“ May 15, 2002; Ken Breen interview (Apr. 23, 2004); Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
The author Mark H Gaffney commented on this finding of „innocuousness“:
Notice … the commission makes no mention in its footnote of the 36 other companies identified by the SEC in its insider trading probe. What about the pre-9/11 surge in call options for Raytheon, for instance, or the spike in put options for the behemoth Morgan Stanley, which had offices in WTC 2? The 9/11 Commission Report offers not one word of explanation about any of this. The truth, we must conclude, is to be found between the lines in the report’s conspicuous avoidance of the lion’s share of the insider trading issue.
Indeed, if the trading was truly „innocuous“, as the report states, then why did the SEC muzzle potential whistleblowers by deputizing everyone involved with its investigation? The likely answer is that so many players on Wall Street were involved that the SEC could not risk an open process, for fear of exposing the unthinkable. This would explain why the SEC limited the flow of information to those with a „need to know“, which, of course, means that very few participants in the SEC investigation had the full picture.
It would also explain why the SEC ultimately named no names. All of which hints at the true and frightening extent of criminal activity on Wall Street in the days and hours before 9/11. The SEC was like a surgeon who opens a patient on the operating room table to remove a tumor, only to sew him back up again after finding that the cancer has metastasized through the system.
At an early stage of its investigation, perhaps before SEC officials were fully aware of the implications, the SEC did recommend that the FBI investigate two suspicious transactions. We know about this thanks to a 9/11 Commission memorandum declassified in May 2009 which summarizes an August 2003 meeting at which FBI agents briefed the commission on the insider trading issue. The document indicates that the SEC passed the information about the suspicious trading to the FBI on September 21, 2001, just ten days after the 9/11 attacks.
Although the names in both cases are censored from the declassified document, thanks to some nice detective work by Kevin Ryan we know whom (in one case) the SEC was referring to. The identity of the suspicious trader is a stunner that should have become prime-time news on every network, world-wide. Kevin Ryan was able to fill in the blanks because, fortunately, the censor left enough details in the document to identify the suspicious party who, as it turns out, was none other than Wirt Walker III, a distant cousin to then-president G W Bush.
Several days before 9/11, Walker and his wife Sally purchased 56,000 shares of stock in Stratesec, one of the companies that provided security at the World Trade Center up until the day of the attacks. Notably, Stratesec also provided security at Dulles International Airport, where AA 77 took off on 9/11, and also security for United Airlines, which owned two of the other three allegedly hijacked aircraft. At the time, Walker was a director of Stratesec. Amazingly, Bush’s brother Marvin was also on the board.
Walker’s investment paid off handsomely, gaining $50,000 in value in a matter of a few days. Given the links to the World Trade Center and the Bush family, the SEC lead should have sparked an intensive FBI investigation. Yet, incredibly, in a mind-boggling example of criminal malfeasance, the FBI concluded that because Walker and his wife had „no ties to terrorism … there was no reason to pursue the investigation.“ The FBI did not conduct a single interview. [34]
For this translation, I asked Kevin Ryan via e-mail if he could send me a link for his „nice detective work“. Ryan, who’s in my humble opinion one of roughly 10 people around the world who have to be taken seriously regarding 9/11, replied:
You are referring to my paper „Evidence for Informed Trading on the Attacks of September 11.“ [See here.] The following two references from the paper are relevant to what you are describing. [2] 9/11 Commission memorandum entitled „FBI Briefing on Trading“, prepared by Doug Greenburg, 18 August 2003, [22].
The 9/11 Commission memorandum that summarized the FBI investigations refers to the traders involved in the Stratesec purchase. From the references in the document, we can make out that the two people had the same last name and were related. This fits the description of Wirt and Sally Walker, who were known to be stock holders in Stratesec. Additionally, one (Wirt) was a director at the company, a director at a publicly traded company in Oklahoma (Aviation General), and chairman of an investment firm in Washington, DC (Kuwam Corp). Here are two other recent articles on Stratesec and its operators. [See here and here.]
The stock of Stratesec, I should add by myself, increased in value from $0.75 per share on September 11 to $1.49 per share when the market re-opened on September 17. As a firm that provides technology-based security for large commercial and government facilities, Stratesec benefited from the soaring demand of security companies right after 9/11.
It is also remarkable what Ryan wrote to me regarding a company on which he did some research, too: Viisage Corp, another high-tech security firm.
Kevin Ryan: In late 2005, George Tenet became a director for Viisage, which had been flagged by the SEC for 9/11 trading but never investigated. Viisage was led by Roger LaPenta, formerly of Lockheed.
Seven months later, in 2006, FBI director Louis Freeh also joined the Viisage board. One might think that when both the CIA director (on 9/11) and the FBI director (from 1993 to June 2001) joined a company suspected of 9/11 insider trading, we might want to go back and actually investigate the SEC’s flagging of that company. But, of course, that was not the case. In 2009, „Bandar Bush“ hired Freeh as his personal attorney.
Freeh is nowadays the bankruptcy trustee of the alleged market manipulator MF Global. And about his client, the former Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar, I should add that we know for sure that he bankrolled indirectly via his wife two of the alleged would-be 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi. [35]
But let’s get back to the subject of destruction. On September 11, not only human life, aircraft and buildings were destroyed in New York City, but also data on computers and in archives. For example, several federal agencies occupied space in Building 7 of the World Trade Center, including the Securities and Exchange Commission on floors 11 to 13.
Those and other data could have given information about the alleged 9/11 insider trading (though it seems to be very unlikely that no backup existed elsewhere independent of the local computer systems). In fact, some technology companies were commissioned to recover damaged hard disks, which had been recovered from the debris and dust of Ground Zero.
One of these companies was the English company group Convar, more precisely: their data rescue center in the German city Pirmasens. Erik Kirschbaum from the news agency Reuters reported in December 2001 that Convar had at that time successfully restored information from 32 computers, supporting „suspicions that some of the 911 transactions were illegal“.
‚The suspicion is that inside information about the attack was used to send financial transaction commands and authorizations in the belief that amid all the chaos the criminals would have, at the very least, a good head start,‘ says Convar director Peter Henschel.“ [36] Convar received the costly orders – according to Kirschbaum´s report the companies had to pay between $20,000 and $30,000 per rescued computer – in particular from credit card companies, because: „There was a sharp rise in credit card transactions moving through some computer systems at the WTC shortly before the planes hit the twin towers. This could be a criminal enterprise – in which case, did they get advance warning? Or was it only a coincidence that more than $100 million was rushed through the computers as the disaster unfolded?“ [37]
The companies for which Convar was active cooperated with the FBI. If the data were reconstructed they should have been passed on to the FBI, and the FBI, according to its statutory mandate, should have initiated further investigation based on the data to find out who carried out these transactions. Henschel was optimistic at the time that the sources for the transactions would come to light.
Richard Wagner, a Convar employee, told Kirschbaum that „illegal transfers of more than $100 million might have been made immediately before and during the disaster. ‚There is a suspicion that some people had advance knowledge of the approximate time of the plane crashes in order to move out amounts exceeding $100 million,‘ ele diz. ‚They thought that the records of their transactions could not be traced after the main frames were destroyed‘.“ [38]
Wagner’s observation that there had been „illegal financial transactions shortly before and during the WTC disaster“ matches an observation which Ruppert describes in Crossing the Rubicon . Ruppert was contacted by an employee of Deutsche Bank, who survived the WTC disaster by leaving the scene when the second aircraft had hit its target.
According to the employee, about five minutes before the attack the entire Deutsche Bank computer system had been taken over by something external that no one in the office recognized and every file was downloaded at lightning speed to an unknown location. The employee, afraid for his life, lost many of his friends on September 11, and he was well aware of the role which the Deutsche Bank subsidiary Alex Brown had played in insider trading. [39]
I was curious and wanted more information from Convar regarding their work on the WTC-computer hard drives, but also about the statements made by Peter Henschel and Richard Wagner. Thus, I contacted the agency which represents Convar for press matters, with a written request. But their agency „ars publicandi“ informed me swiftly:
Due to time constraints, we can currently offer you neither information nor anyone on the part of our client to talk to regarding this requested topic.
I also approached KrollOntrack, a very interesting competitor of Convar in writing. Ontrack Data Recovery, which also has subsidiaries in Germany, was purchased in 2002 by Kroll Inc – „one of the nation’s most powerful private investigative and security firms, which has long-standing involvement with executive protection US government officials including the president. This would require close liaison with the Secret Service.“ [40]
At the time of the 9/11 attacks, a certain Jerome Hauer was one of the managing directors at Kroll Inc. He had previously established the crisis center for the mayor of New York City as director of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which occupied office space on the 23rd floor of the WTC Building 7. Hauer helped former FBI agent John O’Neill to get the post of the head of Security Affairs at the WTC, and spent the night of September 11 with O’Neill in New York before the latter lost his life on September 11 in the WTC. Hauer was most likely involved in the planning of „Tripod II“, the war game exercise at the port of New York City. [41]
Therefore, I found it appealing to uncover some more details of this aspect, or, more accurately to find out if Ontrack or KrollOntrack had received an order in 2001 or after to rescue computer hard drives from the WTC. The answer I received from KrollOntrack said:
Kroll Ontrack was not at the site of the data recovery – the devices at the Twin Towers have been completely destroyed or vaporized. The firm Kroll was, however, at that time active in the field of computer-forensic investigations, securing devices in the surrounding buildings.
In essence, these two inquiries did not help me at all. If anything, a further question arose: why did KrollOntrack send me a response, where it was really obvious that the content did not match the facts? After all, I had written in my inquiry that Convar had received orders to restore damaged computer hard drives from the World Trade Center.
I sent a new inquiry, attaching a link for Erik Kirschbaum’s Reuters article and additional cinematic reports on Convar’s which showed that some of the WTC disks had not been „completely destroyed or vaporized“. I stated to KrollOntrack: „Your answer does not seem to match the facts, when it comes to ‚completely destroyed or vaporized‘. Will you still stick to your answer?“
KrollOntrack then replied that their previously given assessment constituted „not a statement, but an opinion“.
I do not find this assessment worthless, because it is in line with the knowledge of the general public and can easily be refuted in argumentum in contrario by Convar´s activities.
One film report to which I referred to in my second inquiry to KrollOntrack originated from the German television journal Heute-Journal broadcast on March 11, 2002, on ZDF, and the other from the Dutch TV documentary Zembla, broadcast on September 10, 2006.
The ZDF report showed that Convar received the WTC disks from the US Department of Defense and that Convar had managed until March 2002 to recover more than 400 hard drives. It also reported that the private companies that employed Convar had paid between $25,000 and $50,000 per hard drive. In the TV documentary Zembla, Convar essentially maintained its position as it had been reported by Erik Kirschbaum in 2001.
Obviously, in connection with 9/11 there has not only been insider trading via put options, but there is additional evidence that there have been illegal financial transactions via credit cards through which more than 100 million US dollars were removed from the WTC computer systems.
Those occurred shortly before and during the WTC disaster. It remains unclear what the FBI did later on with the data recovered by Convar. On the other hand, it may have been not very much, as can be seen from a memorandum from the 9/11 Commission, which was released in May 2009.
The 9/11 Commission asked the FBI about the use of credit cards for insider dealing. On the basis of the information provided by the FBI, the commission came to the conclusion that no such activity occurred because „the assembled agents expressed no knowledge of the reported hard-drive recovery effort or the alleged scheme“ & # 8211; but above all „everything at the WTC was pulverized to near powder, making it extremely unlikely that any hard-drives survived“. [42]
The activities of Convar, however, prove the exact opposite.
But it gets even better. According to Zembla, the FBI was directly involved with the data rescue efforts of Convar. And on top of it, the broadcast of Heute-Journal reported that Convar worked in that „highly sensitive“ matter with several federal agencies of the United States government.
So there have been ample indications for insider trading based on foreknowledge of the attacks, but there are very few hard facts as Catherine Austin Fitts, a former managing director and member of the board of the Wall Street investment bank Dillon, Read & Co, Inc (now part of UBS), pointed out when I talked with her about this topic.
Ms Fitts, what are your general thoughts related to the alleged 9/11-insider trading?
Catherine Austin Fitts: Well, I’ve never been able to see concrete evidence that the insider trading has been proved. There’s a lot of anecdotal information from investment bankers and people in the investment community that indicate that there was significant insider trading, particularly in the currency and bond markets, but again it hasn’t been documented.
I think around situations like 9/11 we’ve seen things that can only be explained as insider trading. Therefore, it wouldn’t surprise me if it turns out the allegations are true, because my suspicion is that 9/11 was an extremely profitable covert operation and a lot of the profits came from the trading. It wouldn’t even surprise me if it turns out that the Exchange Stabilization Fund traded it and that some of the funding for the compensation fund for the victims came from the ESF.
Insider trading happens around these kinds of events, but if you really want to produce evidence of insider trading, you need the subpoena powers of the SEC, and of course we know that they haven’t exercised them. If anything, right after 9/11, the government settled a significant amount of cases I presume because a lot of the documents were destroyed by the destruction of WTC building number 7, where the SEC offices and other governmental investigation offices were. [43]
Fitts, who had written a longer essay in 2004 related to this, replied to my question about who had benefited from 9/11:
Catherine Austin Fitts: 9/11 was extraordinarily profitable for Wall Street, they of course got a kind of „Get Out of Jail Free card“ as I’ve just described. In addition, the largest broker of government bonds, Cantor Fitzgerald, was destroyed, and there was a great deal of money missing from the federal government in the prior four or five years. If you look at the amount of funds involved, it is hard to come to a conclusion other than massive securities fraud was involved, so I find it very interesting that this happened. [44]
A short explanation: Cantor Fitzgerald’s headquarters were located in the North Tower of the WTC (floors 101-105). On 9/11, the company lost nearly two-thirds of its entire workforce, more than any other tenant in the WTC. (Also two other government bonds brokers, Garbon Inter Capital and Eurobrokers, occupied office space in the WTC towers that were destroyed.) Back to Fitts and the question: „Cui bono 9/11?“
Catherine Austin Fitts: In addition, the federal government took the position that they couldn’t produce audited financial statements after 9/11, because they said the office at the Pentagon that produced financial statements was destroyed. Now given what I know of the federal set up of financial statements, I am skeptical of that statement.
But needless to say, if you take the government on its word, you had another „Get Out of Jail Free card“ for four trillion dollars and more missing from the federal government. So if you’re just looking at the financial fraud angle, there were a lot of parties that benefited from 9/11. But then of course what 9/11 did, it staged the passage of the Patriot Act and a whole series of laws and regulations that I collectively refer to as „The Control on Concentration of Cash Flow Act.“ It gave incredible powers to centralize.
In addition, if you look at monetary policies right after 9/11 – I remember I was over in the City of London driving around with a money manager and his phone rang and he answered it on his speaker phone. It was somebody on Wall Street who he hadn’t talked to since before 9/11, and he said to him: „Oh Harry, I am so sorry about what has happened, it must have been very traumatic.“ And the guy said: „Don’t be ridiculous! We were able to borrow cheap short and invest long, we’re running a huge arbitrage, we’re making a fortune, this is the most profitable thing that ever happened to us!“ & # 8211; So you could tell the monetary policies and sort of insider games were just pumping profits into the bank at that time, so that was very profitable.
But of course the big money was used for a significant movement of the military abroad and into Afghanistan and then into Iraq … You could see that the country was being prepared to go to war. And sure enough, 9/11 was used as a justification to go to war in Afghanistan, to go to war in Iraq, and commit a huge number of actions, and now much of the challenges about the budget are the result of extraordinary expenditures on war including in Afghanistan and Iraq and the costs of moving the army abroad and engaging in this kind of empire building with ground military force.
So I think if you ask Cui Bono on 9/11, one of the big categories was all the people who made money on engineering the popular fear they needed to engineer these wars. I believe whether it was financial fraud, engineering new laws or engineering wars, it was a fantastically profitable covert operation. [45]
In that category of people who benefit from 9/11 are also the arms manufacturer Raytheon, whose share price gained directly from the 9/11 attacks. Trading of the shares of Raytheon, the producer of Tomahawk and Patriot missiles (and parent company of E-systems, whose clients include the National Security Agency and CIA), experienced an abrupt six-time increase of call option purchases on the day immediately before September 11. [46]
The outright purchase of call options implies the expectation that a stock price will rise. In the first week after 9/11, when the New York Stock Exchange opened again, the value of Raytheon actually shot up considerably. Looking at the development of the stock price, the impression is a very weak performance before the attacks – and then, after resumption of trade, a „gap“ (at substantial volume) upwards. In other words: just under $25 on September 10, the low in the period between August 20 to September 28, at $31, 50 on September 17 and up to $34,80 on September 27, 2001.
With regards to government bonds, buyers of US Treasury securities with a maturity of five years were also winners. These securities were traded in an unusually large volume shortly before the attacks. The Wall Street Journal reported at least in early October 2001 that the Secret Service had started an investigation into a suspiciously high volume of US government bond purchases before the attacks. The Wall Street Journal explained:
Five-year Treasury bills are the best investments in the event of a global crisis, in particular one like this which has hit the United States. The papers are treasured because of their safety, and because they are covered by the US government, and usually their prices rise if investors shun riskier investments, such as shares. [47]
Adding to this phenomenon, the government issues these bonds that serve as a basis of money creation for funding a war such as the immediately declared „war on terror“, engaging the Tomahawks from Raytheon. And here it may again be useful to have a quick look at the „cui bono“ relationship:
The US Federal Reserve creates money to fund the war and lends it to the American government. The American government in turn must pay interest on the money they borrow from the Central Bank to fund the war. The greater the war appropriations, the greater the profits are for bankers. [48]
A multi-layered combination, one could say.
I also talked about the topic of 9/11 insider trading with one of the world’s leading practitioners at the interface between the international capital markets, the national security policy of the US as well as geopolitics, James G Rickards. He gave me some answers in a personal discussion, which I am allowed to repeat here with his expressed approval.
Question: Did suspicious trading activities of uncovered put options on futures markets occur shortly before 9/11?
James G Rickards: Well, the trading documents certainly look suspicious. It is simply a fact that an unusually high volume of purchases of put-options for the two airlines occurred over the three trading days before the attacks. This is a mere fact, no speculation, no guessing around. This is clearly obvious from the documents of the trading sessions on the derivatives exchanges.
Question: Do you think that the intelligence agencies could have got a warning signal based on this information?
James G Rickards: Theoretically that is possible, if are you are looking and watching out for this. But there was far more significant information, which was ignored.
Question: Do you also think that some people with foreknowledge operated speculatively in the option markets?
James G Rickards: Based on the documentation of the trading session it seems that this has been the case, yes.
Let’s sum up a bit at the end. We have, among other things:
The „nice detective work“ by Kevin Ryan related to Stratesec/Wirt Walker III. Some highly inconsistent information vis-a-vis Convar/illegal credit card transactions. Scientific papers supporting the allegations that there were indeed unusual trading activities in the option market before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, although the 9/11 Commission (based on the investigation of the SEC and the FBI) ruled that possibility out.
As it became clear that I would publish this article here at Asia Times Online, I contacted the US Federal Bureau of Investigation via its press spokesman Paul Bresson in order „to give the FBI the opportunity to give a public statement with regards to three specific issues“. Those three specific issues were the ones I have just highlighted. Related to each of them I’ve asked Mr Bresson/the FBI: „Could you comment on this for the public, please?“ Up to this moment, Mr Bresson/the FBI did not respond to my inquiry in any way whatsoever. Does this come as a surprise?
I’ve also got back in touch with „ars publicandi“, the firm that does public relations for Convar in Germany. The response said: „Unfortunately I have to inform you that the status has not changed, and that Convar considers the issue of 9/11 as dead in general.“
As you have read, the status in August of last year was slightly different.
At the end of this article, I should perhaps mention that this research ultimately led to negative consequences for me. After I contacted the FBI, I was informed by the publisher of a German financial website, for which I conducted interviews for a professional fee (and had already prepared more work), that no further cooperation was possible. Now that I will come in one way or another into the focus of the FBI, any association with me would be undesirable.
Well, you know the rules.
As far as the abnormal option trades around 9/11 are concerned, I want to give Max Keiser the last word in order to point out the significance of the story.
Max Keiser: Regardless of who did it, we can know that more than a few had advance warning – the trading in the option market makes that clear.
[1] Compare Michael C. Ruppert: “Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age Of Oil“, New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, 2004, page 152.
[2] Ibid., page 153.
[3] Ibid., page 154 – 155.
[4] Ibid., page 170.
[5] Ibid., page 238 – 253: “9/11 Insider Trading, or ‘You Didn’t Really See That, Even Though We Saw It.’“
[6] Ibid., page 239.
[7] Compare Chris Blackhurst: “Mystery of terror ‘insider dealers’”, published at The Independent on October 4, 2001 under:
[8] Compare “Profits of Death“, published at From the Wilderness on December 6, 2001 under:
[9] For the fact, that it was George Tenet who recruited Krongard, compare George Tenet: “At the Center of the Storm”, Harper Collins, New York, 2007, page 19.
[10] Compare Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri and Loriano Mancini: “Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Option Markets”, University of Zurich, April 2010, online at:
[11] Nafeez M. Ahmed: „Geheimsache 09/11. Hintergründe über den 11. September und die Logik amerikanischer Machtpolitik“, Goldmann Verlag, Munich, 2004, page 182. (Translated back into English from German.)
[12] Compare Michael C. Ruppert: “Crossing the Rubicon“, page 244 – 247.
[13] Wing-Keung Wong, Howard E. Thompson und Kweehong Teh: “Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?”, published at Social Sciences Research Network, April 2010, under:
[14] Compare “Bank of America among 38 stocks in SEC’s attack probe”, published at Bloomberg News on October 3, 2001, archived under:
[15] Michael C. Ruppert: “Crossing the Rubicon“, page 243.
[17] “Suppressed Details of Criminal Insider Trading Lead Directly into the CIA’s Highest Ranks”, published at From the Wilderness on October 9, 2001 under:
[18] Compare “Early September 2001: Almost Irrefutable Proof of Insider Trading in Germany”, published at History Commons under:
[19] Allen M. Poteshman: “Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001”, published in The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, 2006, Vol. 79, Edition 4, page 1703-1726.
[20] Wing-Keung Wong, Howard E. Thompson und Kweehong Teh: “Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?”, see endnote 13.
[21] Ibid. The authors refer to Erin E. Arvedlund: “Follow the money: terrorist conspirators could have profited more from fall of entire market than single stocks“, published in Barron’s on October 8, 2001.
[22] Wong, Thompson, Teh: “Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?”
[25] Marina Alcaraz: “11 septembre 2001: des volumes inhabituels sur les options peu avant l’attentat”, published in Les Echos, page 34, September 10, 2001, online at:
[26] Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri and Loriano Mancini: “Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Option Markets”, see endnote 10.
[30] Compare Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri and Loriano Mancini: “Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Option Markets”, published at the University of Zurich on September 7, 2011 under: bf. uzh. ch/publikationen/pdf/2098.pdf.
[31] Vgl. Lars Schall: “Sapere Aude!“, German Interview with Dr. Daniele Ganser, published at LarsSchall on August 18, 2011 under:
[32] Compare a copy of the letter by the SEC on MaxKeiser under:
[33] Compare related to this agreement Matt Taibbi: “Is the SEC Covering Up Wall Street Crimes?”, published at Rolling Stone on August 17, 2011 under:
[34] Mark H. Gaffney: “Black 9/11: A Walk on the Dark Side”, published at Foreign Policy Journal on March 2, 2011 under:
[35] Compare Peter Dale Scott: “Launching the U. S. Terror War: the CIA, 9/11, Afghanistan, and Central Asia”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10, Issue 12, No 3, March 19, 2012, online at: japanfocus/-Peter_Dale-Scott/3723.
[35] Erik Kirschbaum: “German Firm Probes Last-Minute World Trade Center Transactions“, published at Reuters on December 19, 2001, online at:
[38] Michael C. Ruppert: “Crossing the Rubicon“, page 244.
[39] Ibid., page 423.
[40] Ibid., page 423 – 426.
[41] Commission Memorandum: “FBI Briefing on Trading“, dated August 18, 2003, page 12, online at: media. nara. gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00269.pdf.
[42] Lars Schall: “9/11 Was A Fantastically Profitable Covert Operation”, Interview with Catherine Austin Fitts, published at LarsSchall on September 3, 2011 under:
[43] Ibid. Compare further related to the “cui bono“ topic Catherine Austin Fitts: “9-11 Profiteering: A Framework for Building the ‘Cui Bono?’“, published at GlobalResearch on March 22, 2004 under: globalresearch. ca/articles/FIT403A. html.
[44] Lars Schall: “9/11 Was A Fantastically Profitable Covert Operation”, see endnote 42.
[45] Compare “Bank of America among 38 stocks in SEC’s attack probe”, see endnote 14. “A Raytheon option that makes money if shares are more than $25 each had 232 options contracts traded on the day before the attacks, almost six times the total number of trades that had occurred before that day. A contract represents options on 100 shares. Raytheon shares soared almost 37 percent to $34.04 during the first week of post-attack U. S. trading.”
[46] Compare Barry Grey: “Suspicious trading points to advance knowledge by big investors of September 11 attacks”, published at World Socialist Web Site on October 5, 2001 under:
[47] J. S. Kim: “Inside the Illusory Empire of the Banking Commodity Con Game”, published at The Underground Investor on October 19, 2010 under:

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This clip comes courtesy of core of corruption. Purchasing a put option entitles the owner to sell a stock at a contractually stated price, the "strike price", any time until the contract expires. If the market price of the stock goes down below the "strike price", the owner of the put-option can buy the stock (if not already owned) and simultaneously sell the same stock at that "strike price", making a profit if the cost of the option itself does not exceed the net revenue. This deals with evidence of insider trading only. It does not deal with speculations. Nor does it deal with certain open questions about financial issues surrounding September 11th that otherwise deserve investigations:
•Huge financial transactions have been reported to have taken place at computers at the World Trade Center minutes before the attacks.
•Selling short (borrowing a stock and selling it, then returning it later through purchasing).
•Markets outside the United States.
•Disappearances of gold and securities from the World Trade Center.
•The specific financial firms directly hit by planes, and the financial investigations sabotaged by the WTC or Pentagon attacks.
•Insurance payoffs, particularly to the owner of destroyed buildings, particularly to Larry Silverstein.
Still, judging by the reported change the next day in open interest (open interest is the amount of the put contract remaining unexercised), a 500 purchase did indeed occur on September 7. In other words, a volume of 2000 occurred over two days, not one day (1500, then 500). This would not seem to affect Poteshman's work since he used the change in open interest for his measure rather than volume data, but it does raise a general concern about the SEC data. A volume level of 2000 for the first day does appear both in Zarembka (p. 66) and in Chesney, et al. (2010, p. 35, Table 2) and is implicitly retained in the Commission's own report despite that 2004 memo it had received (Zarembka, p. 68).

Put option world trade center

Suppressed Details of Criminal Insider Trading Lead Directly into the CIA’s Highest Ranks.
FTW - October 9, 2001 – Although uniformly ignored by the mainstream U. S. media, there is abundant and clear evidence that a number of transactions in financial markets indicated specific (criminal) foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the case of at least one of these trades -- which has left a $2.5 million prize unclaimed -- the firm used to place the “put options” on United Airlines stock was, until 1998, managed by the man who is now in the number three Executive Director position at the Central Intelligence Agency.
Until 1997 A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard had been Chairman of the investment bank A. B. Castanho. A. B. Brown was acquired by Banker’s Trust in 1997. Krongard then became, as part of the merger, Vice Chairman of Banker’s Trust-AB Brown, one of 20 major U. S. banks named by Senator Carl Levin this year as being connected to money laundering. Krongard’s last position at Banker’s Trust (BT) was to oversee “private client relations.” In this capacity he had direct hands-on relations with some of the wealthiest people in the world in a kind of specialized banking operation that has been identified by the U. S. Senate and other investigators as being closely connected to the laundering of drug money.
THE SCOPE OF KNOWN INSIDER TRADING.
Before looking further into these relationships it is necessary to look at the insider trading information that is being ignored by Reuters, The New York Times and other mass media. It is well documented that the CIA has long monitored such trades – in real time – as potential warnings of terrorist attacks and other economic moves contrary to U. S. interests. Previous stories in FTW have specifically highlighted the use of Promis software to monitor such trades.
It is necessary to understand only two key financial terms to understand the significance of these trades, “selling short” and “put options”.
“Selling Short” is the borrowing of stock, selling it at current market prices, but not being required to actually produce the stock for some time. If the stock falls precipitously after the short contract is entered, the seller can then fulfill the contract by buying the stock after the price has fallen and complete the contract at the pre-crash price. These contracts often have a window of as long as four months.
“Put Options,” are contracts giving the buyer the option to sell stocks at a later date. Purchased at nominal prices of, for example, $1.00 per share, they are sold in blocks of 100 shares. If exercised, they give the holder the option of selling selected stocks at a future date at a price set when the contract is issued. Thus, for an investment of $10,000 it might be possible to tie up 10,000 shares of United or American Airlines at $100 per share, and the seller of the option is then obligated to buy them if the option is executed. If the stock has fallen to $50 when the contract matures, the holder of the option can purchase the shares for $50 and immediately sell them for $100 – regardless of where the market then stands. A call option is the reverse of a put option, which is, in effect, a derivatives bet that the stock price will go up.
A September 21 story by the Israeli Herzliyya International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, entitled “Black Tuesday: The World’s Largest Insider Trading Scam?” documented the following trades connected to the September 11 attacks:
- Between September 6 and 7, the Chicago Board Options Exchange saw purchases of 4,744 put options on United Airlines, but only 396 call options… Assuming that 4,000 of the options were bought by people with advance knowledge of the imminent attacks, these “insiders” would have profited by almost $5 million.
- On September 10, 4,516 put options on American Airlines were bought on the Chicago exchange, compared to only 748 calls. Again, there was no news at that point to justify this imbalance;… Again, assuming that 4,000 of these options trades represent “insiders,” they would represent a gain of about $4 million.
- [The levels of put options purchased above were more than six times higher than normal.]
- No similar trading in other airlines occurred on the Chicago exchange in the days immediately preceding Black Tuesday.
- Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., which occupied 22 floors of the World Trade Center, saw 2,157 of its October $45 put options bought in the three trading days before Black Tuesday; this compares to an average of 27 contracts per day before September 6. Morgan Stanley’s share price fell from $48.90 to $42.50 in the aftermath of the attacks. Assuming that 2,000 of these options contracts were bought based upon knowledge of the approaching attacks, their purchasers could have profited by at least $1.2 million. Merrill Lynch & amp; Co., with headquarters near the Twin Towers, saw 12,215 October $45 put options bought in the four trading days before the attacks; the previous average volume in those shares had been 252 contracts per day [a 1200% increase!]. When trading resumed, Merrill’s shares fell from $46.88 to $41.50; assuming that 11,000 option contracts were bought by “insiders,” their profit would have been about $5.5 million.
- European regulators are examining trades in Germany’s Munich Re, Switzerland’s Swiss Re, and AXA of France, all major reinsurers with exposure to the Black Tuesday disaster. [ FTW Note: AXA also owns more than 25% of American Airlines stock making the attacks a “double whammy” for them.]
On September 29, 2001 – in a vital story that has gone unnoticed by the major media – the San Francisco Chronicle reported, “Investors have yet to collect more than $2.5 million in profits they made trading options in the stock of United Airlines before the Sept. 11, terrorist attacks, according to a source familiar with the trades and market data.
“The uncollected money raises suspicions that the investors – whose identities and nationalities have not been made public – had advance knowledge of the strikes.” They don’t dare show up now. The suspension of trading for four days after the attacks made it impossible to cash-out quickly and claim the prize before investigators started looking.
“… October series options for UAL Corp. were purchased in highly unusual volumes three trading days before the terrorist attacks for a total outlay of $2,070; investors bought the option contracts, each representing 100 shares, for 90 cents each. [This represents 230,000 shares]. Those options are now selling at more than $12 each. There are still 2,313 so-called “put” options outstanding [valued at $2.77 million and representing 231,300 shares] according to the Options Clearinghouse Corp.”
“…The source familiar with the United trades identified Deutsche Bank Alex. Brown, the American investment banking arm of German giant Deutsche Bank, as the investment bank used to purchase at least some of these options…” This was the operation managed by Krongard until as recently as 1998.
As reported in other news stories, Deutsche Bank was also the hub of insider trading activity connected to Munich Re. just before the attacks.
CIA, THE BANKS AND THE BROKERS.
Understanding the interrelationships between CIA and the banking and brokerage world is critical to grasping the already frightening implications of the above revelations. Let’s look at the history of CIA, Wall Street and the big banks by looking at some of the key players in CIA’s history.
Clark Clifford – The National Security Act of 1947 was written by Clark Clifford, a Democratic Party powerhouse, former Secretary of Defense, and one-time advisor to President Harry Truman. In the 1980s, as Chairman of First American Bancshares, Clifford was instrumental in getting the corrupt CIA drug bank BCCI a license to operate on American shores. His profession: Wall Street lawyer and banker.
John Foster and Allen Dulles – These two brothers “designed” the CIA for Clifford. Both were active in intelligence operations during WW II. Allen Dulles was the U. S. Ambassador to Switzerland where he met frequently with Nazi leaders and looked after U. S. investments in Germany. John Foster went on to become Secretary of State under Dwight Eisenhower and Allen went on to serve as CIA Director under Eisenhower and was later fired by JFK. Their professions: partners in the most powerful - to this day - Wall Street law firm of Sullivan, Cromwell.
Bill Casey – Ronald Reagan’s CIA Director and OSS veteran who served as chief wrangler during the Iran-Contra years was, under President Richard Nixon, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. His profession: Wall Street lawyer and stockbroker.
David Doherty - The current Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange for enforcement is the retired General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
George Herbert Walker Bush – President from 1989 to January 1993, also served as CIA Director for 13 months from 1976-7. He is now a paid consultant to the Carlyle Group, the 11 th largest defense contractor in the nation, which also shares joint investments with the bin Laden family.
A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard – The current Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is the former Chairman of the investment bank A. B. Brown and former Vice Chairman of Banker’s Trust.
John Deutch - This retired CIA Director from the Clinton Administration currently sits on the board at Citigroup, the nation’s second largest bank, which has been repeatedly and overtly involved in the documented laundering of drug money. This includes Citigroup’s 2001 purchase of a Mexican bank known to launder drug money, Banamex.
Nora Slatkin – This retired CIA Executive Director also sits on Citibank’s board.
Maurice “Hank” Greenburg – The CEO of AIG insurance, manager of the third largest capital investment pool in the world, was floated as a possible CIA Director in 1995. FTW exposed Greenberg’s and AIG’s long connection to CIA drug trafficking and covert operations in a two-part series that was interrupted just prior to the attacks of September 11. AIG’s stock has bounced back remarkably well since the attacks. To read that story, please go to copvcia/stories/part_2.html .
One wonders how much damning evidence is necessary to respond to what is now irrefutable proof that CIA knew about the attacks and did not stop them. Whatever our government is doing, whatever the CIA is doing, it is clearly NOT in the interests of the American people, especially those who died on September 11.
[© COPYRIGHT, 2001, Michael C. Ruppert and FTW Publications, copvcia . Todos os direitos reservados. & # 150; May be reprinted or distributed for non-profit purposes only.]

SUPPRESSED DETAILS OF CRIMINAL INSIDER TRADING.
LEAD DIRECTLY INTO THE CIA'S HIGHEST RANKS.
CIA EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR "BUZZY" KRONGARD.
MANAGED FIRM THAT HANDLED "PUT" OPTIONS ON UAL.
by Michael C. Ruppert.
FTW, October 9, 2001 - Although uniformly ignored by the mainstream U. S. media, there is abundant and clear evidence that a number of transactions in financial markets indicated specific (criminal) foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the case of at least one of these trades -- which has left a $2.5 million prize unclaimed -- the firm used to place the "put options" on United Airlines stock was, until 1998, managed by the man who is now in the number three Executive Director position at the Central Intelligence Agency. Until 1997 A. B. "Buzzy" Krongard had been Chairman of the investment bank A. B. Castanho. A. B. Brown was acquired by Banker's Trust in 1997. Krongard then became, as part of the merger, Vice Chairman of Banker's Trust-AB Brown, one of 20 major U. S. banks named by Senator Carl Levin this year as being connected to money laundering. Krongard's last position at Banker's Trust (BT) was to oversee "private client relations". In this capacity he had direct hands-on relations with some of the wealthiest people in the world in a kind of specialized banking operation that has been identified by the U. S. Senate and other investigators as being closely connected to the laundering of drug money.
Krongard (re?) joined the CIA in 1998 as counsel to CIA Director George Tenet. He was promoted to CIA Executive Director by President Bush in March of this year. BT was acquired by Deutsche Bank in 1999. The combined firm is the single largest bank in Europe. And, as we shall see, Deutsche Bank played several key roles in events connected to the September 11 attacks.
THE SCOPE OF KNOWN INSIDER TRADING.
Before looking further into these relationships it is necessary to look at the insider trading information that is being ignored by Reuters, The New York Times and other mass media. It is well documented that the CIA has long monitored such trades - in real time - as potential warnings of terrorist attacks and other economic moves contrary to U. S. interests. Previous stories in FTW have specifically highlighted the use of Promis software to monitor such trades.
It is necessary to understand only two key financial terms to understand the significance of these trades, "selling short" and "put options".
"Selling Short" is the borrowing of stock, selling it at current market prices, but not being required to actually produce the stock for some time. If the stock falls precipitously after the short contract is entered, the seller can then fulfill the contract by buying the stock after the price has fallen and complete the contract at the pre-crash price. These contracts often have a window of as long as four months.
"Put Options" are contracts giving the buyer the option to sell stocks at a later date. Purchased at nominal prices of, for example, $1.00 per share, they are sold in blocks of 100 shares. If exercised, they give the holder the option of selling selected stocks at a future date at a price set when the contract is issued. Thus, for an investment of $10,000 it might be possible to tie up 10,000 shares of United or American Airlines at $100 per share, and the seller of the option is then obligated to buy them if the option is executed. If the stock has fallen to $50 when the contract matures, the holder of the option can purchase the shares for $50 and immediately sell them for $100 - regardless of where the market then stands. A call option is the reverse of a put option, which is, in effect, a derivatives bet that the stock price will go up.
A September 21 story by the Israeli Herzliyya International Policy Institute for Counter terrorism, entitled "Black Tuesday: The World's Largest Insider Trading Scam?" documented the following trades connected to the September 11 attacks:
- Between September 6 and 7, the Chicago Board Options Exchange saw purchases of 4,744 put options on United Airlines, but only 396 call options. Assuming that 4,000 of the options were bought by people with advance knowledge of the imminent attacks, these "insiders" would have profited by almost $5 million .
- On September 10, 4,516 put options on American Airlines were bought on the Chicago exchange, compared to only 748 calls. Again, there was no news at that point to justify this imbalance; Again, assuming that 4,000 of these options trades represent "insiders", they would represent a gain of about $4 million .
- [The levels of put options purchased above were more than six times higher than normal.]
- No similar trading in other airlines occurred on the Chicago exchange in the days immediately preceding Black Tuesday.
- Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., which occupied 22 floors of the World Trade Center, saw 2,157 of its October $45 put options bought in the three trading days before Black Tuesday; this compares to an average of 27 contracts per day before September 6 . Morgan Stanley's share price fell from $48.90 to $42.50 in the aftermath of the attacks. Assuming that 2,000 of these options contracts were bought based upon knowledge of the approaching attacks, their purchasers could have profited by at least $1.2 million .
- Merrill Lynch & Co., which occupied 22 floors of the World Trade Center, saw 12,215 October $45 put options bought in the four trading days before the attacks; the previous average volume in those shares had been 252 contracts per day [a 1200% increase!] . When trading resumed, Merrill's shares fell from $46.88 to $41.50; assuming that 11,000 option contracts were bought by "insiders", their profit would have been about $5.5 million .
- European regulators are examining trades in Germany's Munich Re, Switzerland's Swiss Re, and AXA of France, all major reinsurers with exposure to the Black Tuesday disaster. [FTW Note: AXA also owns more than 25% of American Airlines stock making the attacks a "double whammy" for them.]
On September 29, 2001 - in a vital story that has gone unnoticed by the major media - the San Francisco Chronicle reported, " Investors have yet to collect more than $2.5 million in profits they made trading options in the stock of United Airlines before the Sept. 11, terrorist attacks, according to a source familiar with the trades and market data ".
& quot; The uncollected money raises suspicions that the investors - whose identities and nationalities have not been made public - had advance knowledge of the strikes ". They don't dare show up now. The suspension of trading for four days after the attacks made it impossible to cash-out quickly and claim the prize before investigators started looking.
"October series options for UAL Corp. were purchased in highly unusual volumes three trading days before the terrorist attacks for a total outlay of $2,070; investors bought the option contracts, each representing 100 shares, for 90 cents each. [This represents 230,000 shares]. Those options are now selling at more than $12 each. There are still 2,313 so-called "put" options outstanding [valued at $2.77 million and representing 231,300 shares] according to the Options Clearinghouse Corp".
"The source familiar with the United trades identified Deutsche Bank Alex. Brown, the American investment banking arm of German giant Deutsche Bank, as the investment bank used to purchase at least some of these options" This was the operation managed by Krongard until as recently as 1998.
As reported in other news stories, Deutsche Bank was also the hub of insider trading activity connected to Munich Re. just before the attacks.
CIA, THE BANKS AND THE BROKERS.
Understanding the interrelationships between CIA and the banking and brokerage world is critical to grasping the already frightening implications of the above revelations. Let's look at the history of CIA, Wall Street and the big banks by looking at some of the key players in CIA's history.
Clark Clifford - The National Security Act of 1947 was written by Clark Clifford, a Democratic Party powerhouse, former Secretary of Defense, and one-time advisor to President Harry Truman. In the 1980s, as Chairman of First American Bancshares, Clifford was instrumental in getting the corrupt CIA drug bank BCCI a license to operate on American shores. His profession: Wall Street lawyer and banker.
John Foster and Allen Dulles - These two brothers "designed" the CIA for Clifford. Both were active in intelligence operations during WW II. Allen Dulles was the U. S. Ambassador to Switzerland where he met frequently with Nazi leaders and looked after U. S. investments in Germany. John Foster went on to become Secretary of State under Dwight Eisenhower and Allen went on to serve as CIA Director under Eisenhower and was later fired by JFK. Their professions: partners in the most powerful - to this day - Wall Street law firm of Sullivan, Cromwell.
Bill Casey - Ronald Reagan's CIA Director and OSS veteran who served as chief wrangler during the Iran-Contra years was, under President Richard Nixon, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. His profession: Wall Street lawyer and stockbroker.
David Doherty - The current Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange for enforcement is the retired General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
George Herbert Walker Bush - President from 1989 to January 1993, also served as CIA Director for 13 months from 1976-7. He is now a paid consultant to the Carlyle Group, the 11th largest defense contractor in the nation, which also shares joint investments with the bin Laden family.
A. B. "Buzzy" Krongard - The current Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is the former Chairman of the investment bank A. B. Brown and former Vice Chairman of Banker's Trust.
John Deutch - This retired CIA Director from the Clinton Administration currently sits on the board at Citigroup, the nation's second largest bank, which has been repeatedly and overtly involved in the documented laundering of drug money. This includes Citigroup's 2001 purchase of a Mexican bank known to launder drug money, Banamex.
Nora Slatkin - This retired CIA Executive Director also sits on Citibank's board.
Maurice "Hank" Greenburg - The CEO of AIG insurance, manager of the third largest capital investment pool in the world, was floated as a possible CIA Director in 1995. FTW exposed Greenberg's and AIG's long connection to CIA drug trafficking and covert operations in a two-part series that was interrupted just prior to the attacks of September 11. AIG's stock has bounced back remarkably well since the attacks. To read that story, please go to fromthewilderness/free/ciadrugs/part_2.html.
One wonders how much damning evidence is necessary to respond to what is now irrefutable proof that CIA knew about the attacks and did not stop them. Whatever our government is doing, whatever the CIA is doing, it is clearly NOT in the interests of the American people, especially those who died on September 11.

September 11 Put Call.
were the stocks of various airlines shorted just before 9/11?
Claim: In the days just prior to the 11 September 2001, large quantities of stock in United and American Airlines were traded by persons with foreknowledge of the upcoming 9/11 attacks.
Origins: On 11 September 2001, four planes were hijacked and used in the Attack on America: American Airlines Flight 11 leaving Boston bound for Los Angeles, American Airlines Flight 77 leaving Washington bound for Los Angeles, United Airlines Flight 175 leaving Boston bound for Los Angeles, and United Airlines Flight 93 leaving Newark bound for San Francisco. Each of these planes was deliberately crashed, killing all on board — two into the World Trade Center towers, one into the Pentagon, and one into a field in Pennsylvania. (Only the delay in takeoff of UA Flight 93 and the actions of the alerted passengers on board prevented it from becoming yet another instrument of destruction resulting in an even greater loss of life.)
The operation had taken years to plan, and the perpetrators knew well in advance which airlines would be affected.
In the month prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, unusual trading activity involving American and United Airlines stock was noted by market analysts who at the time had no idea what to make of it. Wildly unusual discrepancies in the put and call ratio — 25 to 100 times normal — were reportedly observed in stock options of the two airlines. In one case, Bloomberg’s Trade Book electronic trading system identified option volume in UAL (parent of United Airlines) on 16 August 2001 that was 36 times higher than usual.
(Options are wagers that the price of a 100-share block of a particular stock will rise or fall by a certain date. “Puts” are “shorts” — bets the stock price will fall. “Calls” are bets the price will rise. Thus, one who has reason to believe a particular company is about to suffer a terrible reversal of fortune would purchase “puts” against that entity’s stock.)
But it was during the final few trading days (the market closes on weekends) that the most unusual variances in activity occurred. Bloomberg data showed that on 6 September 2001, the Thursday before that black Tuesday, put-option volume in UAL stock was nearly 100 times higher than normal: 2,000 options versus 27 on the previous.
On 6 and 7 September 2001, the Chicago Board Options Exchange handled 4,744 put options for United Airlines’ stock, translating into 474,000 shares, compared with just 396 call options, or 39,600 shares. On a day that the put-to-call ratio would normally have been expected to be roughly 1:1 (no negative news stories about United had broken), it was instead 12:1.
On 10 September 2001, another uneventful news day, American Airlines’ option volume was 4,516 puts and 748 calls, a ratio of 6:1 on yet another day when by rights these options should have been trading even. No other airline stocks were affected; only United and American were shorted in this fashion.
Accelerated investments speculating a downturn in the value of Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch (two New York investment firms severely damaged by the World Trade Center attack) were also observed.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the “9/11 Commission”) investigated these rumors and found that although some unusual (and initially seemingly suspicious) trading activity did occur in the days prior to September 11, it was all coincidentally innocuous and not the result of insider trading by parties with foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks:
Highly publicized allegations of insider trading in advance of 9/11 generally rest on reports of unusual pre-9/11 trading activity in companies whose stock plummeted after the attacks. Some unusual trading did in fact occur, but each such trade proved to have an innocuous explanation. For example, the volume of put options — instruments that pay off only when a stock drops in price — surged in the parent companies of United Airlines on September 6 and American Airlines on September 10 — highly suspicious trading on its face. Yet, further investigation has revealed that the trading had no connection with 9/11. A single U. S.-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al Qaeda purchased 95 percent of the UAL puts on September 6 as part of a trading strategy that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10. Similarly, much of the seemingly suspicious trading in American on September 10 was traced to a specific U. S.-based options trading newsletter, faxed to its subscribers on Sunday, September 9, which recommended these trades. The SEC and FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities industry, devoted enormous resources to investigating this issue, including securing the cooperation of many foreign governments. These investigators have found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous.
Last updated : 11 December 2005.
Carpenter, Dave. “Option Exchange Probing Reports of Unusual Trading Before Attacks.”
The Associated Press. 18 September 2001.
Schoolman, Judith. “Probe of Wild Market Swings in Terror-Tied Stocks.”
[New York] Daily News. 20 September 2001 (p. 6).
Toedtman, James and Charles Zehren. “Profiting from Terror?”

Negociação com informações privilegiadas.
Pre-9/11 Put Options on Companies Hurt by Attack Indicates Foreknowledge.
As transações financeiras nos dias anteriores ao ataque sugerem que certos indivíduos usaram o conhecimento prévio do ataque para obter lucros enormes. 1 A evidência do uso de informações privilegiadas inclui:
Huge surges in purchases of put options on stocks of the two airlines used in the attack -- United Airlines and American Airlines Surges in purchases of put options on stocks of reinsurance companies expected to pay out billions to cover losses from the attack -- Munich Re and the AXA Group Surges in purchases of put options on stocks of financial services companies hurt by the attack -- Merrill Lynch & Co., e Morgan Stanley e Bank of America Enorme aumento nas compras de opções de compra de ações de um fabricante de armas que se espera ganhar com o ataque - a Raytheon Huge aumenta as compras de títulos do Tesouro dos EUA de 5 anos.
In each case, the anomalous purchases translated into large profits as soon as the stock market opened a week after the attack: put options were used on stocks that would be hurt by the attack, and call options were used on stocks that would benefit.
As opções de compra e venda são contratos que permitem que seus titulares vendam e comprem ativos, respectivamente, a preços específicos até uma determinada data. As opções de venda permitem que seus detentores lucrem com o declínio nos valores das ações porque permitem que as ações sejam compradas a preço de mercado e vendidas pelo preço mais alto da opção. A relação entre o volume de contratos de opção de venda e os contratos de opção de compra é chamada de taxa de venda / compra. A proporção é geralmente menor que um, com um valor em torno de 0,8 considerado normal. 2
American Airlines and United Airlines, and several insurance companies and banks posted huge loses in stock values when the markets opened on September 17. Put options -- financial instruments which allow investors to profit from the decline in value of stocks -- were purchased on the stocks of these companies in great volume in the week before the attack.
United Airlines and American Airlines.
Duas das corporações mais prejudicadas pelo ataque foram a American Airlines (AMR), a operadora do voo 11 e o voo 77, e a United Airlines (UAL), a operadora do voo 175 e o voo 93. Segundo a CBS News, na semana anterior No ataque, a relação de compra / venda da American Airlines era de quatro. 3 A relação de compra / venda da United Airlines foi 25 vezes acima do normal em 6 de setembro. 4.
Os picos nas opções de venda ocorreram em dias sem complicações para as companhias aéreas e seus preços de ações.
A Bloomberg News informou que as opções de venda das companhias aéreas aumentaram para a fenomenal alta de 285 vezes a média.
When the market reopened after the attack, United Airlines stock fell 42 percent from $30.82 to $17.50 per share, and American Airlines stock fell 39 percent, from $29.70 to $18.00 per share. 7
Reinsurance Companies.
Várias empresas do ramo de resseguros devem sofrer enormes perdas com o ataque: a Munich Re da Alemanha e a Swiss Re da Suíça - as duas maiores resseguradoras do mundo, e o Grupo AXA da França. Em setembro de 2001, o San Francisco Chronicle estimou um passivo de US $ 1,5 bilhão para a Munich Re e US $ 0,55 bilhão para o AXA Group e telegraph. co. uk estimava um passivo de 1,2 bilhão para a Munich Re e 0,83 bilhão para a Swiss Re. 8 9.
A negociação de ações da Munich Re foi quase o dobro do seu nível normal em 6 de setembro e 7, e a negociação de ações da Swiss Re foi mais do que o dobro do seu nível normal em 7 de setembro. 10.
Empresas de serviços financeiros.
Merrill Lynch e Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & amp; Co. e Merrill Lynch & amp; Co. were both headquartered in lower Manhattan at the time of the attack. A Morgan Stanley ocupava 22 andares da North Tower e a Merrill Lynch tinha sedes próximas às Torres Gêmeas. A Morgan Stanley, que viu uma média de 27 opções de compra de ações compradas por dia antes de 6 de setembro, viu 2.157 opções de compra compradas nos três pregões anteriores ao ataque. Merrill Lynch, which saw an average of 252 put options on its stock bought per day before September 5, saw 12,215 put options bought in the four trading days before the attack. Morgan Stanley's stock dropped 13% and Merrill Lynch's stock dropped 11.5% when the market reopened. 11
O Bank of America apresentou um aumento de cinco vezes na negociação de opção de venda na quinta e na sexta-feira antes do ataque.
While most companies would see their stock valuations decline in the wake of the attack, those in the business of supplying the military would see dramatic increases, reflecting the new business they were poised to receive.
Raytheon, maker of Patriot and Tomahawk missiles, saw its stock soar immediately after the attack. As compras de opções de compra de ações da Raytheon aumentaram seis vezes no dia anterior ao ataque.
A Raytheon foi multada em milhões de dólares inflando os custos de equipamentos que vende para os militares dos EUA. A Raytheon possui uma subsidiária secreta, a E-Systems, cujos clientes incluíram a CIA e a NSA. 14
Notas do Tesouro dos EUA.
Five-year US Treasury notes were purchased in abnormally high volumes before the attack, and their buyers were rewarded with sharp increases in their value following the attack.
A investigação da SEC.
Logo após o ataque, a SEC circulou uma lista de ações para empresas de valores mobiliários em todo o mundo em busca de informações. 16 A widely circulated article states that the stocks flagged by the SEC included those of the following corporations: American Airlines, United Airlines, Continental Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, US Airways airlines, Martin, Boeing, Lockheed Martin Corp., AIG, American Express Corp, American International Group, AMR Corporation, AXA SA, Bank of America Corp, Bank of New York Corp, Bank One Corp, Cigna Group, CNA Financial, Carnival Corp, Chubb Group, John Hancock Financial Services, Hercules Inc., L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc., LTV Corporation, Marsh & McLennan Cos. Inc., MetLife, Progressive Corp., General Motors, Raytheon, W. R. Grace, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Lone Star Technologies, American Express, Citigroup Inc., Royal & amp; Sun Alliance, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Vornado Reality Trust, Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter & Co., XL Capital Ltd., and Bear Stearns.
An October 19 article in the San Francisco Chronicle reported that the SEC, after a period of silence, had undertaken the unprecedented action of deputizing hundreds of private officials in its investigation:
Em um comunicado de duas páginas emitido a "todas as entidades relacionadas a valores mobiliários" em todo o país, a SEC solicitou que as empresas designassem altos funcionários que apreciam "a natureza sensível" do caso e podem confiar que "exercem a discrição apropriada" como "ponto". pessoas ligando os investigadores do governo e a indústria. 17
Michael Ruppert, a former LAPD officer, explains the consequences of this action:
Interpreting and Reinterpreting the Data.
Uma análise dos relatórios da imprensa sobre o aparente insider trading relacionado ao ataque mostra uma tendência, com os primeiros relatórios destacando as anomalias e, mais tarde, os relatórios sendo desculpados. Em seu livro Crossing the Rubicon [Cruzando o Rubicão], Michael C. Ruppert ilustra esse ponto, primeiro extraindo uma série de relatórios publicados logo após o ataque:
A jump in UAL (United Airlines) put options 90 times (not 90 percent) above normal between September 6 and September 10, and 285 times higher than average on the Thursday before the attack.
- CBS News, 26 de setembro Um salto na American Airlines colocou as opções 60 vezes (não 60%) acima do normal no dia anterior aos ataques.
-- CBS News, September 26 No similar trading occurred on any other airlines.
-- Bloomberg Business Report, the Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT), Herzliyya, Israel [citing data from the CBOE] 3 Morgan Stanley saw, between September 7 and September 10, an increase of 27 times (not 27 percent) in the purchase of put options on its shares. 4
3. "Mechanics of Possible Bin Laden Insider Trading Scam," Herzlyya International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT), September 22, 2001. Michael C. Ruppert, "The Case for Bush Administration Advance Knowledge of 9-11 Attacks," From the Wilderness April 22, 2002. Posted at Centre for Research and Globalization <globalresearch. ca/articles/RUP203A. html>.
4. ICT, op. cit, citing data from the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE). [. ] "Terroristas treinados no CBPE." Chicago Sun-Times, 20 de setembro de 2001, & lt; suntimes / terror / stories / cst-nws-trade20.html & gt ;. "Sonda de troca de opções link para ataques confirmados," [. ] Chicago Sun-Times, 21 de setembro de 2001, & lt; suntimes / terror / stories / cst-fin-trade21.html & gt ;.
Ruppert, então, ilustra uma aparente tentativa de enterrar a história, explicando-a como nada incomum. Um artigo de 30 de setembro do New York Times afirma que "explicações benignas estão surgindo" na investigação da SEC. 20 The article blames the activity in put options, which it doesn't quantify, on "market pessimism," but fails to explain why the price of the stocks in the airlines doesn't reflect the same market pessimism.
The fact that $2.5 million of the put options remained unclaimed is not explained at all by market pessimism, and is evidence that the put option purchasers were part of a criminal conspiracy. 21

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Xnxx vedios.
Trazer de volta o layout antigo com pesquisa de imagens.
Desinformação na ordem DVD.
Eu pedi DVD / Blueray "AL. A confidencial" tudo que eu consegui foi Blue ray & amp; um contato # para obter o DVD que não funcionou. Eu encomendo minha semana com Marilyn ____DVD / blue ray & amp; Eu peguei os dois - tolamente, assumi que o mesmo se aplicaria a L. A. ___ETC não. Eu não tenho uma máquina de raio azul ----- Eu não quero uma máquina de raio azul Eu não quero filmes blueray. Como obtenho minha cópia de DVD de L. A. Confidential?
yahoo, pare de bloquear email.
Passados ​​vários meses agora, o Yahoo tem bloqueado um servidor que pára nosso e-mail.
O Yahoo foi contatado pelo dono do servidor e o Yahoo alegou que ele não bloquearia o servidor, mas ainda está sendo bloqueado. CEASE & amp; DESISTIR.
Não consigo usar os idiomas ingleses no e-mail do Yahoo.
Por favor, me dê a sugestão sobre isso.
Motor de busca no Yahoo Finance.
Um conteúdo que está no Yahoo Finance não aparece nos resultados de pesquisa do Yahoo ao pesquisar por título / título da matéria.
Existe uma razão para isso, ou uma maneira de reindexar?
consertar o que está quebrado.
Eu não deveria ter que concordar com coisas que eu não concordo com a fim de dizer o que eu acho - eu não tive nenhum problema resolvido desde que comecei a usar o Yahoo - fui forçado a jogar meu antigo mensageiro, trocar senhas, obter novas messenger, disse para usar o meu número de telefone para alertar as pessoas que era o meu código de segurança, receber mensagens diárias sobre o bloqueio de yahoo tentativas de uso (por mim) para quem sabe por que como ele não faz e agora eu obter a nova política aparecer em cada turno - as empresas costumam pagar muito caro pela demografia que os usuários fornecem para você, sem custo, pois não sabem o que você está fazendo - está lá, mas não está bem escrito - e ninguém pode responder a menos que concordem com a política. Já é ruim o suficiente você empilhar o baralho, mas depois não fornece nenhuma opção de lidar com ele - o velho era bom o suficiente - todas essas mudanças para o pod de maré comendo mofos não corta - vou relutantemente estar ativamente olhando - estou cansado do mudanças em cada turno e mesmo aqueles que não funcionam direito, eu posso apreciar o seu negócio, mas o Ameri O homem de negócios pode vender-nos ao licitante mais alto por muito tempo - desejo-lhe boa sorte com sua nova safra de guppies - tente fazer algo realmente construtivo para aqueles a quem você serve - a cauda está abanando o cachorro novamente - isso é como um replay de Washington d c
Eu não deveria ter que concordar com coisas que eu não concordo com a fim de dizer o que eu acho - eu não tive nenhum problema resolvido desde que comecei a usar o Yahoo - fui forçado a jogar meu antigo mensageiro, trocar senhas, obter novas messenger, disse para usar o meu número de telefone para alertar as pessoas que era o meu código de segurança, receber mensagens diárias sobre o bloqueio de yahoo tentativas de uso (por mim) para quem sabe por que isso acontece e agora eu recebo a nova política em cada turno - as empresas costumam pagar muito pela demografia que os usuários fornecem para você ... mais.